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MANN, JOHN BRIGHT, Ed. D. A Phenomenoiogical Inquiry into the Concept of 
Home 1987 Directed by Dr. Fritz Mengert. 133 pp. 
This inquiry considers a coalescence of epistemology and ontology as 
an initial stage to thinking about the condition of being-at-home-in-a-world. 
Martin Heidegger 's work on existence and being is discussed as a 
consideration of the relationship between self, world and earth. In addition 
to a Heideggerian perspective on existence, attention is given to Edmund 
Husserl and Martin Buber. In particular, Husserl s work with 
inter subjectivity and Buber s work with relationship as an expression of 
distance and engagement are considered as a means of expanding 
Heidegger 's thoughts on being in the world. 
Ross Mooney's work is then taken up as a way to consider engagement 
with the world as an intentional act of poetic thinking. Mooney's model of an 
infinity sign is discussed as the flow into the world of poetic thinking. Poetic 
thinking as preliminary to expression through scientific thinking is discussed 
as a matching or fitting between "me" and "world". The works of Rainer 
Maria Rilke are discussed as evidence of poetic thinking. The intersection of 
Mooney's infinity sign is understood as the act of intentionality in which a 
division between self and world occur. A "twisting" of the uni-verse into the 
flow of Mooney's infinity sign is considered first as the initial separation 
from the womb at birth. The separation is then discussed as an existential 
search for home through the matching of inner and outer worlds. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
APPROVAL PAGE i i 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE INQUIRY 1 
A context for home 13 
A coalescence of epistemology and ontology 17 
A meaning for home 23 
II. THE EXISTENTIAL CONDITION OF BEING 31 
III. THE PHENOMENA OF POETIC THOUGHT 64 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF POETIC THOUGHT IN PRAGMATIC 
CULTURE 102 
V. EPILOGUE 127 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 130 
i i i 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO INQUIRY 
Much of the contemporary discourse on alienation and the loss of 
community centers on issues that can generally be described as grounded 
within a socio-political context. As such, these arguments are acceptable in 
their appraisal of alienation from the dynamics of class, race, sex, and other 
constructs of social inquiry. However, these appraisals are unsatisfactory in 
their failure to consider the construction of the context qua World as a 
unique and peculiar phenomenological problem. By excluding a discussion of 
the constitution, development, and maintenance of a world-view, the 
discourse is unable to consider fundamental areas of concern. As a result of 
the taking of the world as a given, a phenomenological inquiry into the 
formative roles of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity is dismissed. With this 
dismissal, what I believe to be powerful and thematic existential issues are 
omitted from an appraisal of contemporary alienation. 
Alienation, when considered within a socio-political metaphor and 
expressed in terms of oppression and repression attempts to account for the 
estrangement of "individual" from 'group". Taking this individual/group 
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relationship as the reference or focal point for understanding alienation fails 
to account for deeper and more personal issues of a "making my-self at 
home" in the world. A thorough search for an explication of alienation does 
not begin with an exhibition of social conditions predisposed to the 
construction and maintenance of alienation. The search begins with an 
explication of the constitution of the world-view, and, with the consciousness 
of such a view. A "homing in the world", as an expression of this 
consciousness, can begin to inform an understanding of being-lost-in-the-
world as an expression of the estrangement of epistemology and ontology. 
To be lost in the world, expressed as: "I do not know how it is that I came to 
be here", can begin an inquiry into a dis-placement, a sense of estrangement 
from the real. 
Dis-placement from the real may involve not only the self-perception 
of a dislocation from the world but also the realization of the condition of 
being dis-placed. Realization of the condition includes a more complex form 
of estrangement in which the individual realizes he is realized as "stranger". 
The complexity may be the result of a prior estrangement. Estrangement, as 
being realized as dis-placed, may be the condition in which the individual 
always "finds" him-self. As a result, the estrangement is made more 
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profound in that "I" can only "find my-self" as lost, or, as homeless. Being 
realized as homeless involves the objectification of self by the surrounding 
world as the Other/s. The surrounding quality of this world assumes the 
qualities of a hostile rather than a welcoming, or, benign environment. 
Rather than finding my-self as the center of a world, "I" find my-self at the 
center of the world which is at least inhospitable. As "object of" rather than 
"subject to", "I" am dis-located from a position in which "I" can negotiate 
events and from the negotiation construct a world. Later, I will look at how 
this "being realized" as homeless may be explained as a fundamental 
element of being-at-home in the world. By comparing the realization of 
being-lost with Husserl's ideas of inter-subjective social ontology 
(particularly "de-centering"), the relationship between self and world as a 
dynamic process of coming-to- know can be developed. 
Reality, understood as a subjective and coherent construction of 
experiences, depends upon meaning to establish connections between the 
person and his or her World. While the phrase "coherent construction" may 
appear redundant at first glance, it is not. The degree of coherence within 
this construction of experiences varies with the degree of personal 
meaning-making at the moment of experience. Construction, in this sense, 
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involves more than the assemblage of one event to the "next". While this 
assemblage is important, construction also indicates the internal construction 
of an event. Beginning with the selection of an event through attendance-to, 
the event "happens" as it is internally correlated wit', experiences. As the 
event is made to make sense, that is, co-related with what has made sense in 
the past, the event is then fashioned for assembly. A "filling of the moment 
with experience" is only possible to the degree that a personal connection is 
established with that moment. A partial to complete loss of the moment, as 
a function of a partial or complete loss of subjective involvement, can be 
understood first as an initial loss of World. 
More critical, however, is the way in which this initial momentary loss 
leads to an increased loss of moments. With each failure of personal 
investment within a moment, the potential for investment within the 
subsequent moment is diminished. Meaning-making is important as the 
connection between individual and moment. In this way, the singular 
connection of individual and moment, as an event, becomes potentially 
thematic and sequential. Events, interpreted as sequential and made 
meaningful because of the implicit order of sequence, take on the additional 
significance of progressive time. The significance of the moment is the 
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potential for cumulative, personal meaning-making. As cumulative and 
personal, the moment as moment allows for "me" to become thematic or 
universal through "my" live. The duration of that theme is dependent upon 
an understanding of each moment as a consequence of "me" and "my 
meaning. By being at the moment, "I" am able to construct and maintain an 
analogy between what is personal and what is universal. As Kant writes, 
We require an underlying ground which exists at all times, that is 
something abiding and permanent, of which all change and coexistence 
are only so many ways (modes of time) in which the permanent exists. 
Without the additional meaning provided though sequence, the individual 
becomes progressively dis-engaged from world in both how he knows and 
what he knows. As a falling "out of sync", this loss suggests the possibility 
for progressively greater loss of moments through a repeated and 
cumulative lack of subjective construction. 
External and public contributions, for example from the realm of 
"common sense", may be seen as oppositional or even antagonistic to a 
personal construction of reality. When the "common" of common sense 
indicates selective distribution, the concept itself can be understood as 
antagonistic to personal, subjective meaning-making. To the degree that 
"common" indicates group, non-negotiable consensual "sense", it may also 
6 
indicate minority or less significant meaning. The power of this type of 
common sense comes from its ability to assign value to consensual 
knowledge and, at the same time, de-mean personal knowledge as 
dis-sensual and of less significance to the group. The assignment of less 
significant meaning may also have a further effect on "place" or "position" in 
the world. The less significant "my" meaning, the less involvement or 
negotiation between "me" and "world". It is paradoxical that this type of 
"common sense" relies upon non-common or selective distribution and 
appropriation to maintain its own significance. 
In fact, the potential for failing to acquire common sense, even the 
notion of "acquisition" of common sense, indicates the need for an 
un-common distribution of common sense. Heraclitus' notion of "what is 
common to all" suggests an interpretation of what is "common" that is more 
universal than the above. In his understanding, what is common to us all is 
a need for meaning. We need meaning and often share this need through 
community. Suggesting that common sense may or may not be acquired, as 
in the first example, provides for the concept of "non-sense" and renders 
alienation a function of common sense. While consensual common sense is 
not necessarily threatening to a subjective construction of memory, the 
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potential for overpowering an establishment of inter-subjective reality 
through resistance of personal investment is a critical consideration. 
On the other hand, contributions from the "outside", (whether through 
personal conversation or from public common sense), are integral as the 
"stuff" for an inter-subjective construction. The inter-subjective construction 
of reality, as a profound act of balance between "me" and "world", can be 
understood as a thematization of daily experiences. Experience, as fragments 
for a construction of reality, can be broadly understood here as either 
consonnant or dis-consonnant with prior experience. 
Perception as an interpretation of consonnance will be a significant 
consideration for this study. When meaning, as the glue connecting daily life 
experiences fails, and each experience can be seen only as random and 
beyond personal manipulation, the condition can be defined as un-real. An 
apparent randomness of experiences, lacking the cohesion and consistency 
provided by "me" through thematic personal meaning, results in a 
meaning-less world. Because of its meaningless-ness, the world becomes, for 
"me", un-real. Unable to either extract or inject my-self into the world it 
becomes necessary to separate self and world with the assignment of 
"un-reality". In this way, the relationship of "me" and world becomes unreal. 
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"I" am unable to make sense out of the world, or, to make a world out of 
senses. Disabled by the failure to make sense "1" finally see my-self as not 
making sense to the world. As a result, the relation between "me" and 
"world" becomes a more complex triadic relation between "world", "I", and 
"my-self". 
The "I" and the "my-self", are distinguished in their relations with 
"world" and, as such, in disagreement. When "I" perceive "my-self" as not 
making sense to the world, "I" am perceiving a difference between the 
relations of "I"-"world" and "my-self'-'world". As a form of estrangement, 
being-lost-in-the-world, can be understood as the expression: "This world is 
not real to me", and, "I am not real to this world." To be at home in the 
world can begin to inform an understanding of a consciousness conscious of 
the constituent elements of being-in-the-world. Being-at-home, from this 
perspective, can move us toward an understanding of "knowing how it is 
that I come to know I am here". 
A search for a dis-covery of Home as a coalescence of epistemology 
and ontology is likely to be found in a coalescence of a representative 
question from these two domains of thought. As a "growing together", a 
coalescence of these two questions results in an expression of co-relation(s). 
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A representative epistemological question- How is it that I have come to 
know?", and, a representative ontological question-'What is it that I take to 
be real?", cannot be joined as-"How is it that I come know what I take to be 
real?- with the hope for an expression of coalescence. "How is it that I come 
to know what 1 take to be real?", retains an epistemological base and so 
precludes the possibility for an explication of coalescence. Coalescence, as a 
growing together, does not rest on the simple accumulation of these two 
domains. A coalescence of epistemological and ontological inquiry can be 
understood as a distillation from the two domains. 
An understanding of a coalescence of the ontological and 
epistemological positions begins with a coalescence of representative 
questions, through a gathering together of the two positions. This gathering 
together, supplies what Heidegger calls "memory" and serves as the 
re-membering which leads to a consciousness called "home". An exploration 
for "home", where "exploration" is understood as a "calling-out", becomes a 
transcendence of both domains through the dis-covery of "home". 
Transcendence, as a surpassing, expresses the release of this exploration. 
The distinction of two questions is surpassed and subsequently abandoned in 
exchange for a single type of questioning which is expressed here as "home". 
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In the questioning "home" is conceptualized as a transcendental objective 
and explicated from a perspective of transcendent-towards. As the 
demarcation between these two questions collapses and leads to a singular 
investigation, the emergence of a consciousness without an object results. 
The submergence of this demarcation suggests an attempt for the 
establishment of a reciprocal, monothematic understanding. 
The questioning within this transcendence seeks a common sense 
between the two domains and rests on a fundamental derivation. It is that 
derivation which serves as an impetus for the ex-ploration, as the 
"imploration" of the exploration. In looking for the fundamental derivation, 
the search becomes an evocation of "home". 
As a metaphorical coalescence of the epistemological and the 
ontological, "home" rests in the explication of two questions- "How is it that I 
come to know what it is which I take to be real?", and, "Where is it that I 
come to know what it is which I take to be real?". The exploration for a 
coalescence is a search for "sameness" of thought within these two positions. 
Surpassing the boundaries of the two spheres of epistemology and ontology 
by outlining the intra-spherical sameness, the exploration can be seen as a 
phenomenological inquiry into the dualisms created by epistemological and 
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ontological investigations. It may be that various elements of these positions 
can be understood through the metaphor of home as being mutually and 
reciprocally co-existent. This co-existence of elements within each domain 
will be examined for their contributions to the existential condition of 
being-at-home. 
As an "outlining" of the epistemological and ontological positions, the 
inquiry is circumspective and it is this quality which suggests the underlying 
evidence of the phenomenological impulse. An investigation of beginnings, 
of a search for fundamental derivation is a response to a call for a return to 
place, a coming home. As such, the exploration involves an examination of 
home as a metaphor for the problem of being in the same position for the 
first time. It involves, among other elements, an inquiry into how it is we 
come to know something as un-familiar. How is it that we can "come to 
know" in the sense that "coming to" seemingly must require identification 
through objectification of the thing we are directed towards. We must first 
re-cognize the object of our attention as "object". In the re-cognition, the 
"knowing" of an un-familiar object must be an expression of likeness 
between the yet to be known object and an object already "known". In other 
words, the un-known object must be referenced to known object. At what 
12 
point is the "knowing" "knowing enough"? At what point is the object, 
"known" as un-familiar or without reference? could this point of "knowing" 
and "knowing enough" be a place of coalescence within epistemology and 
ontology? It may also be that "knowing" and "knowing enough" are 
determined by the personal relevance or meaning in a particular moment. 
"Knowing" or "knowing enough" may be expressions of what "I" "need to 
know" for where "I" am in the world. As Alfred Schutz writes, 
The world seems to him at any given moment as stratified in different 
layers of relevance, each of them requiring a different degree of 
knowledge. 
An investigation of "coming to" (know) involves the distinction between the 
familiar/un-familiar. A "making distinct" of the familiar and the un-familiar 
requires consideration of the concept of intentionality. As a "directing 
towards", intentionality can be understood as attending to the familiar and, 
in so doing, setting out the un-familiar. Intentionality, as an attending to the 
familiar, "makes" familiar, or, "familiarizes" a world from what is less 
familiar. By making familiar, rather than taking to be familiar, intentionality 
includes a sense of constructive adaptation in which "my" potential world 
conforms to "my current" world up to the moment of "my" intention. 
Bringing "my" world to the world surrounding me, "I" can match what has 
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been familiar with the world now presented to me. In so doing, "my" world 
continues as the absorption of the world around me. 
The fundamental questions for this inquiry will be the questions 
which can express this conceptualization. Because the questions must 
produce a gathering of thought, a re-membering, they are questions leading 
to memory. Because they must eipress a surpassing of both positions they 
are transcendental. What questions lead to a union of place and thought, 
resulting in an expression of position? What questions show the way to an 
understanding of the meaning of "home" as a metaphorcial coalescence of 
place and thought? 
A context for home 
Martin Heidegger's formal structure for questioning informs the 
exploration: what is sought is, first, a context for home; what is interrogated 
is the coming together of epistemology and ontology; and what is to be found 
is a meaning for home in so far as being-at-home can be understood as an 
expression of consonnance. Here it is emphasized that this being-at-home, 
this consonnance is mis-construed if it is understood as finite and somehow 
lethargic. Being-at-home can be understood as a position-taking through the 
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re-cognition of the realization of "place". As such, the position is dynamic 
and precarious, subject always to the demands of balance. To explicate the 
preceding it is necessary to seek a context for home; to seek a coalescence 
between the domains of epistemology and ontology; and, to apprehend a 
meaning for home. 
For a groundwork, this explication of a context for home begins with 
an exhibition of various relationships. Context, from 'contextere" (to weave 
together) is understood as an inter-weaving of a variety of relationships 
which can lead to an elaboration of the context. What is at question is the 
synthesis of the context for home. What are the constituent relationships for 
the synthesis of a context for home? Relationships of this synthesis include 
the relationships of the familiar and the un-familiar, and, the Here and the 
There. By way of an examination of these relationships, a constitution of 
World and how this constitution relates to an exploration of home will also 
be examined [as revealed in the transcendental inter- subjectivity of 
Edmund Husserl (especially in the Fifth Meditation of the Cartesian 
Meditations) and in Martin Heidegger's analysis of "being-in-the-world" 
(especially in his analysis of the Parmenides' fragment in "Poetry, Though, 
and Language")]. Through an examination of the relationships of the 
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familiar/un-familiar and the Here/the There, close inspection of the role of 
exclusion will be discussed. 
Exclusion will be examined, from this perspective, as a determination 
action for both of these relationships (familiar and unfamiliar and Here and 
There). That is, exclusion can be understood as an underlying formative 
action for each of these relationships. Just how and with whom a structure 
for what is taken to be familiar is constructed, as well as how familiarity 
endures and persists, will be a focal point for this exploration. Likewise, the 
relationship between Here and There will be investigated through a 
discussion of the contextual concept of exclusion. The dynamics involving 
either the coming to be or the going from being of each of these 
relationships, will be examined from a temporo-spatial perspective. From 
this perspective, any perseverance of a context for home will be investigated 
as explication for a being-at-home as an existential response to the 
Heraclitean concept of flux. Understood in this way, contributions from the 
relationships of the familiar/un-familiar and the Here/the There to a context 
for home will be examined for their contributions towards a sense of 
temporo-spatial stabilization. 
As such, home, as a consciousness, can be explicated as a relational 
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condition between the countervening elements of outer world and the 
interior of the epoche, and, between time and space. Understood in varying 
degrees of "fixity" or stabilization, "home" can be examined for the possibility 
of an existential hesitation as an arrest of time and the concretization of 
place. Hesitation should not be understood here as a "freezing" of the world, 
but, rather, the "freezing" of a segment of a world through the concept of 
appresentation. Volatile from both time and space considerations, "freezing" 
a world represents a transformation of the world through the development 
of inter-subjectivity. By "holding" a segment of the world "still", the 
possibility for inter-subjective meaning is enhanced. 'You" and "I", through 
the establishment of an inter-subjective experience, are able to agree upon a 
world now held still before us. 
Holding the world still can be seen both as a pre-condition and a 
product of inter-subjectivity. As pre-condition, holding the world still 
represents an intial stage for the possibility of inter-subjective experience. 
Before "you" and "I" can begin to "know" what we can "know" of a world, we 
must first agree to hold a world still. In doing so, "we" dis-place our-selves 
from the world in order to co-inhabit a world. Through the dis-piacement 
we can begin to examine "our" world by exchanging "our" positions relative 
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to "our" frozen world. As a product, through the exchange of relative 
positions, "our" world becomes a medium for inter-subjective experience 
until "you" and "I", for whatever reasons, exhaust that world in terms of 
"our" coming to "know" one another through it. As an intentional 
circumspectual action, based on exclusion, this perspective concentrates on 
the construction and the structural integrity of a placement within time and 
space. Hesitation can be compared with "piece and moment" as the relational 
and non-relational "evidences" of experience, and, with "presence-at-hand" 
and "readiness-at- hand". How experiences come to be categorized from the 
Husserlian and the Heideggerian perspectives is likely to enhance the 
exploration of home. 
A coalescence of eoistemologv and ontology 
Experience, for this discussion, will provide a forum for ontological and 
epistemological contributions to "home". Looking at the ways in which 
epistemological and ontological thought relate to the construction and 
maintenance of experiences, initiates a discussion of the familiar/the 
un-familiar as well as the Here and the There. "How is it that I come to 
know what I take to be real?" suggests a questioning of the role played by 
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familiarity towards the make-up of reality. With this assumption, the 
questioning goes on to determine the role of position (as the Here and the 
There) towards the construction of reality. In short, how does thinking and 
the construction of reality bring us to the concept of "home" and how does 
this concept serve the thinking/construction process? 
The relationship betwen the familiar and the un-familiar is critical to 
a determination of "home". An "everyday" understanding of home naturally 
links home with familiarity, with a sense of ease. Home, understood as 
domestic tranquility, is not the issue. What is at issue is the way in which 
"home" enables or dis-ables experience. In what ways does "home", as a 
context for determining familiarity, allow for or preclude the "filling of a 
moment with experience"? 
A "familiarization" of the world can be seen from several perspectives 
including a process of deduction. As I familiarize the world I "sample out" 
those elements of experience which I can associate with prior experience. By 
regarding only what I take to be familiar, I designate anything "alien" and 
familiarization becomes a process of a narrowing of experiences. 
Paradoxically, with each "new" experience, my experiences are decreased. 
Each "new" experience is "less new" than the previous one within previous 
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contexts. With continual sampling, with continual association, the "run-off" 
of experience is increased. As "my" experiences increase during the passage 
of time, "my" experiencing of the experience also decreases. 
"Familiarization" of a world can also be seen as an initial stage in the 
process leading to an estrangement between "me" and the world. From this 
perspective, familiarization is a pre-condition to un-famliarization. In other 
words, to "know something as un-familiar" it is necessary that "I" first come 
to know it as familiar. Conversely, canl know something only as un-familar? 
In this way, familiarity is seen as a mediative stage for a becoming 
un-familiar with a world. 
Therefore, familiarity becomes an essential element for asking what is 
it that we can know? what is it that we cannot know? and, what is it that is 
called reality? By looking at the relationship between familiarity and 
un-familiarity as a transitional process, the phrase "coming to know" can be 
made clearer. "Coming to know", from this perspective, is understood as a 
transition through the distance of not-knowing to knowing. By informing the 
metaphor with images of transition and distance, the process of "coming to 
know" can be compared with becoming. Just as the confluence of non-being 
and being presents a condition of becoming, "coming to know" presents a 
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confluence of not-knowing and knowing. As I "come to know" I 
metaphorically travel through the relationship of familiarity to 
un-familiarity. By this progression, "I" act as mediator between the two, "I" 
connect the two, and, in so doing, "I" construct a relationship. As a result, 
becoming progressively less familiar with a world is understood as a "setting 
off" of a world which I am "coming to know". 
Implications for the "here" and the "there" rest on the previous 
understanding of "un-familiarization". Understanding familiarization as a 
constituent element of a "homing of a world" grounds the here/there 
relationship by considering the elements of distance and transition. Distance 
and transition of that distance between the familiar and the un-f a miliar 
informs an understanding of a "coming to know". Distance and the transition 
of that distance can also assist in an understanding of the relationship 
between the here and the there. To what extent does the assignment of 
familiarity help determine the positions of the here and the there? How are 
varying degrees of "hereness" or "thereness" an indication of varying degrees 
of familiarity? And, to what extent is there an extension of here as a 
projection of familiarity? The statement "I am here in the world" is a 
statement of the position here referenced to some potential position, "There." 
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It is only through the potential for travel and distance provided by 
the "there" that "I" can be "Here". Without some-place else (There), "I" 
cannot be in place (Here). "My" familiar-Here can be so only in relation to 
"my" un-familiar There. Tension lies in the need to "know" the un-familiar 
as familiar which could be the threshold from the "I" know the un-familiar 
as familiar. That, in turn, could provoke a dis-integration of the here-there 
relationship. In such case "knowing enough" is not "knowing too much" of 
the un-familiar and in so doing, making it familiar. Familiarization may lead 
to the transfer of the "there" to the "here" until "I" am only at "here". By 
losing the possibility of movement and space provided by "there", my "here" 
becomes static. 
An investigation of the here and the there does not conclude with a 
demonstration of relationship based on distance and transition. Here and 
there can also serve the discussion as expressions of time. Understanding "I 
am here" as "I am here (now)", and, "I (was), or (will be) there" provides an 
opportunity to consider time and experience. Positing "hereness" as a 
condition of a present-time experience with a high degree of familiarity; and, 
"thereness" as a condition of a past or future time experience with a lesser 
degree of familiarity, presents an additional relationship of distance and 
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transition. Having established a "coming to know" as dependent upon a 
"setting off of a world", does the there stand ss the "place" of "coming to 
know"? Can I be-at-home when I was or will be There? If 1 am to 
be-at-home must I also be out of time (ecstatic)? 
This discussion will also include a look at the relationship between 
poetic and scientific thought. Specifically, in what ways do poetic thought 
and scientific thought predict and consequently construct their respective 
world reality? As "constructors" of reality, each type of thought understands 
a particular subjective relationship with a world. Poetic thought, as a 
transformation of the world, overtly targets what is taken to be real as 
challenge for transformation. What is taken to be real, as in the transition 
from familiar to un-familiar, implies "taking to be" in an intentional sense. 
The relationship between what is taken to be real and poetic thought, is an 
intentional expression understood as a step within a process of 
transformation. The poetic "charge" is to refute what is taken to be real and 
provide for construction of a transformed world. 
Scientific thought, however, begins with what is taken to be real, as a 
basis for experience. World, as a receptacle for the accumulation of 
experience, provides environment for a coming to know itself reflexively. 
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Categorization, for scientific thought represents a critical concept in which 
experience can be co-related with prior experience as "similar". Similarity, 
as a significant means for systematic accumulation of experience, is made 
possible by categorization. As a referential system, categorization provides 
not only a basis for accumulation but a vehicle by which experiences can be 
arranged. Scientific thought will be explored as an expression of poetic 
thought and the degree to which this expression is enjoyed through structure 
based upon categorization. 
A meaning for home 
A large body of literature including aphorisms, parables, folk-tales, 
and cliches is specifically concerned with the concept of home. Despite this 
attention to the concept, a meaning for "home" remains illusive and ill 
defined. Investigating the literature, especially the cliches related to home, 
may provide a basis for understanding how we understand "home". By 
maneuvering various cliches, whether in the spoken language, or, by a 
transposition of words in the written form, something more than a "word 
game" may emerge. 
If carefully considered, expressions such as "homeward bound" or 
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"feeling at home" reveal the illusory and diverse nature of home coupled 
with a resistance to specific definition. 1 am suggesting that the variety of 
meanings and cliches related to home may express a common set of themes. 
These themes are not easily identified as their commonality may be the 
result of the meaning of the meaning of home. What these cliches may share 
is an attempt not to define home as a specific condition but to reveal the 
"why" of home. Why "home"? Why the curiosity for the concept of "home"? 
While the clear offerings of shelter and protection are pertinent to the 
human need, they represent only one side of the concept. For every image 
of safe-keeping and shelter there are equally poignant images associated 
with the need to leave home. Are there times and places in which it is 
necessary to not be-at-home in the world? Does a necessity for not 
being-at-home-in-the-world have implications for the condition of 
loneliness? Are there times and places in which relationships with other 
people exist, as a result of not-being-at-home? 
As a statement of "my" place in the world, is it possible that 
being-away-from-home is necessary to the concept of "home" itself? 
Being-away-from-home is not an equivalent condition to being-lost-in-the-
world. Being-away-from-home implies a tethered relationship with"home". 
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When "I" am away-from-home, "I" am in a place relative to the "where" of 
"home". It is likely that one element of being-in-the-world contributed by 
the concept of "home" is the provision for a tangential encounter with "my" 
world by serving as a kind of place-marker for the "me". The amount of 
"my" "at-homeness" in the world allows for "my" exploration of the world. 
The safety of "my" return is assured by the stability of the place as home. 
From this perspective, the "why" of "home" is at least partially explained by 
the necessity for the un-f a miliar as a parameter for the familiar. As a place-
marker for "me", "my here" is held while "I" approach there. The approach 
to there is allowed by the ability to abandon, without fear of loss, "my here". 
"Home", in that case, allows "me" to mediate the here and the there, the 
familiar and the un-familiar and serves as the envelope for these 
mediations. The travel from here to "there" is not only an exploration of 
"world" by "me". While the "there" provides a place of the un-familiar it also 
is the place for the Other/s. As Husserl writes, 
As relexively related to itself, my animate bodily organism has the 
central here as its mode of givenness; every other body, and 
accordingly the "other's" body, has the mode "There". 
Unconditionality is a critical consideration to "home" as place-marker 
while "I" encounter the un-familiar. "My" encounter with the un-familiar is 
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made less threatening, and therefore more likely, by the unconditional 
provision for return and acceptance offered through the concept of "home". 
As a holding place for "me", "I" can travel out, leaving "me" at home. In a 
sense, home keeps the "me" that is "me" up to here and now safe while "I" 
attend to the un-familiar that is There. "Home", to serve as place-marker for 
"me" must, among other things, endure, remain constant, and provide 
exclusion. Permanence, or the potential for permanence, is provided by the 
notion that 'home" is always available, unchanged, and here for "me". 
Exclusion is used here as a critical element of belonging. The extent to which 
"I" belong is based at least in part on the extent to which some Other/s is 
excluded. If "belonging" is to have value, it must provide membership and 
the potential for not belonging or exclusion. It is only through the possibilty 
that "I" may not belong that belonging can be. As the place-marker for "me", 
"home" provides a place of return which is always accepting. 
It is paradoxical that the permanence of unconditionality may be 
most important in providing a reference point to experiences with the 
un-familiar. Each tangential encounter can be interpreted through and by 
the constancy of "home". Whether, as a result of "my" excursions into the 
un-familiar, "home" must also change will be discussed at a later point in the 
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discussion. It is not unreasonable to assume, however, that unconditionally, 
to be unconditional, can also be taken as change. 
As an approach to the "why" of home, consideration will be given to 
"home" in relation to loneliness. More specifically, I will consider how 
"home" and "loneliness" inform one another and how each concept provides a 
demarcation within the world. Just as being-away-from-home is a 
place-taking relative to the "where" of "home", loneliness can be understood 
as a mode of being-in-the-world relative to belonging. Being-alone, as a 
relative expression to being-with, depends upon the unconditionality of 
"home". As "home" enables "my" mediation of the familiar and the 
un-familiar, it also eanbles "my" mediation of being-with and being-alone. 
A "homing of a world", when considered as a consciousness in 
response to loneliness, becomes a significant and poignant expression. The 
poignancy is due, in large apart, to the tension cause by the question of 
loneliness. Perhaps by looking at home through loneliness, a mode of 
being-at-home-in-the-world can be seen through varying degrees of pathos. 
Pathos, an expression of suffering, recognizes the existential condition of 
loneliness as a form of being-in-the-world. Re-cognition of the common 
loneliness of man provides for the re-cognition of the suffering of others. In 
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fact, it may be that the re-cognition of existenial loneliness provides for the 
recognition of the Other/s. 
The extent to which "I" experience "my own" suffering may 
profoundly inform "my" understanding the Other as an-other among others, 
like "me", alone. From an anti-pathetic to an em-pathetic to a sym-pathetic 
involvement, each degree expresses a different position-taking in relation 
with a world. Each brings with it a different mode for expression of "being 
present at what happens to us". Each provides a specific way of coming to 
terms with the coming to terms with loneliness. By encountering the world 
in a particular way each perspective may bring clarity to a consciousness in 
response to loneliness. 
As a way of being-in-the-world, these degrees of pathos are not 
individual and specific models. They indicate reference points along a 
continuum of involvement with a world which also includes an a-pathetic 
dis-involVement with the world. The varying degrees of pathos also offer an 
additional perspective on the tangential excursions into the un-familiar 
discussed earlier. By plotting an excursion over a continuum of pathos, it 
may be possible to understand the exploration of the un-familiar as a 
reaching out into the world that is enabled or disabled by the degree of 
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pathetic involvement at each moment of the venture. It may be that the 
excursion is prompted by a sym-pathetic involvement with the world and 
the incursion prompted by the diminishment of sym-pathy towards 
anti-pathy. 
By looking at expressions such as "homeward bound" and considering 
both a usual interpretation as well as a more unusual interpretation, a 
relationship may develop between what "we think we mean" and "why we 
thought it needed to be said". It may be that neither "what we think we 
meant" or "why we thought it needed to be said" is as singularly important 
to "home" as the difference between the two. The discrepancy between 
"meaning" and "what was meant" may be understood as an expression of 
intention, or, "what I think I meant to say". "Homeward bound" as a 
declaration of "I am finally homeward bound" is generally considered as an 
expression of the happiness associated with a departure from the 
un-familiar and a return to more familiar surroundings. It is difficult to 
consider "homeward bound" as an expression of regret or of fear. 
However, as a perspective on loneliness, "homeward bound" can be 
thought of as a "binding to home", as a sense of restraint. It may be that 
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"homeward bound" "means" a binding to, as an expression of "I cannot 
leave". "I cannot leave" can be seen as a reluctance to leave because of a 
fear of loneliness, an anxiety towards being-away-from-home. As an 
expression of the anxiety of loneliness, "homeward bound" discloses an 
insulation, a timidity for encounter. A "homing of the world" is finalized by 
the segregation of "home" and "world". Rather than integrating "me" and 
"world" or "what is inside" and "what is outside", a balance-between is 
replaced by a distinction-between. 
As a statement of condition, "homeward bound" expresses an 
inevitable continuation of isolation. "I" am always already "homeward 
bound". The debilitizing effects of the anxiety of loneliness are enhanced by 
each refusal, with each failure to release. By "staying at home", a 
relationship with the world becomes frozen on a foundation of anxiety and 
dread. As a "homing of world", the world, in that case, is distinguished form 
"home" through the boundaries set by fear and alienation. By preventing an 
encounter with isolation "home" becomes a consciousness establishing a 
condition of loneliness. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EXISTENTIAL CONDITION OF BEING 
To understand loneliness as an existential condition necessary for a 
homing of the world it is important to first look at the question of 
existence-to ask how we are in the world. By looking at Martin Heidegger's 
concept of Being, especially his concepts of "thrownness" and "intentionality" 
and then comparing these with Martin Buber's I-Thou relationship and 
Edmund Husserl's thoughts on intersubjectivity, loneliness can be understood 
as a critical component of being-in-the-world. 
Heidegger's concept of Being, by definition is illusive. As beings in the 
world we are always already here, in the midst of being. As Heidegger 
writes, "To enter into what is said in the phrase "being is" remains 
uncommonly difficult and troublesome for the reason that we are already 
within it" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 174). What we are "in", Being, is explained by 
Heidegger as follows: 
You can, as it were, smell the Being of this building in your nostrils. 
The smell communicates the Being of this thing (Seiende) far more 
immediately and truly than any description of inspection could ever 
do... But do we see Being as we see color and light and shade? Or do 
we hear, smell, taste, feel Being? We here the motorcycle racing 
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through the street. We hear the grouse gliding through the forest. But 
actually we hear only the whirring of the motor, the sound the grouse 
makes... wherein consists Being...? A heavy storm coming up in the 
mountains is.. .wherein consists its Being? A distant mountain range 
under a broad sky... It is. (Waterhouse, 1981, p. 8). 
To understand existence, for Heidegger, is to begin with the Question 
of Being. The question can be understood as an expression of the 
relationship between "me" and Being. It is only as an interrogation of the 
relationship itself that the question of Being can come to light and provide 
for the "unconcealment" of Being. Relationship, understood as mutual and 
reciprocal, depends upon the participation of both members. The members 
of a relationship must turn toward one another as mutual contributors so 
that the resultant context can be explained. It is, for Heidegger, the context 
of Being, constituted by the participation of both "me" and Being, which calls 
it into question. To interrogate the question of Being from either the 
standpoint of "me" or from the Being implies the relationship of the 
constituent other. Heidegger writes, "When we say "Being", it means "Being 
of beings". When we say "being", it means "beings in respect of Being. We 
are always speaking within the Duality" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 227). 
By basing any interrogation of existence upon an explication of either 
element and not concentrating instead on the context created by the 
relationship, contemporary man fails to think. Heidegger's explication of 
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Parmenides leads to the following description of thinking: "It is useful to 
let-lie-before us and so the taking-to-heart also: beings in being" 
(Heidegger, 1968, p. 223). This leads to Heidegger's assertion that the 
question of Being can only be approached by a revitalized thinking that does 
not bifurcate world into the Self and Being but rather considers the 
relationship of the two and their constituent roles within this relationship. 
Karsten Harries writes, "If one had to use the language of subject and object, 
it would be more correct to identify mean s being with the relation holding 
between subject and object than with either subject or object" (Murray, p. 
68). Critical to the relationship between "me" and Being is the reciprocal and 
mutual need each has for the other. Just as "I" need Being in order to be, 
Being needs "me", "wants to be thought", in order that Being might continue. 
To begin to think this relationship, for Heidegger, requires a "step 
back" from traditional metaphysics which failed to think the question of 
being. The failure to think the question is more than a presupposition of the 
answer on the part of contemporary man. For Heidegger, contemporary man 
fails even to remember the question. By failing to remember, man fails in 
the gathering together of himself in being. In the "everydayness" in which 
man find himself more and more, the failure to ask the question 
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progressively becomes a failure to remember to ask. Thinking becomes 
more and more, as the poet Novalis wrote, "the dream of a feeling that has 
been long ago forgotten." 
Referred to by Heidegger as the "neglect'' of the question of Being, the 
neglect leads contemporary man further from a sense of being-in-the-world 
by failing to account for what is most fundamental—"my" relationship with 
Being. By failing to pose the question and, instead, proceeding "as if" an 
answer had been formulated, man, in his everyday conversation fails to 
consider his own Dasein—his being-there-in-the-world. The "as if" of 
contemporary man becomes so pervasive that the continuation of the 
presupposition of an answer further precludes the articulation of the 
question of being. Contemporary man, through neglect, so ignores the 
original question of being that the possibility for recovery grows profoundly 
difficult—"Perhaps even the alternative is no longer a genuine one" 
(Heidegger, 1985, p. 131). These "destitute times" are so by virtue of man's 
failure to think Being. Neglect of the question of being can be understood as 
a dis-integration of the relationship between "me" and the Being. 
"Dis-integration", understood as a breakdown of fundamental connections, 
becomes both a cause for and a result of the inability of contemporary man 
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to think Being. The destitution of the day is the apparent inability of man to 
re-connect with Being and to realize what Heidegger refers to as 
"fundamental ontology". 
The thoughts of Martin Buber on relationship include two critical and 
co-dependent actions—the "primal setting at a distance" and "entering into 
relation". As co-dependent elements for the establishment of relationship 
these actions are helpful in considering the thoughts of Heidegger on the 
neglect of the question of Being. While Buber's concepts are directed toward 
the establishment of an intersubjective relationship as the "between" of men, 
they can be useful when applied to Heidegger's discussion of man and Being. 
Buber writes, 
.. .man is, or can be, in the world as a dweller in an enormous building 
which is always being added to, and to whose limits he can never 
penetrate—for he is capable of grasping the wholeness of the building 
as such. Man is like this because he is the creature (Wesen) through 
whose being (Sein) "what is" (das Seinde) becomes detached from him, 
and recognized for itself (Buber, 1965, p. 61). 
It is this notion of "setting at a distance", understood as a positing, which 
furnishes insight into Heidegger's arguments for the breakdown of the 
relationship. The Being needs man and man needs Being. 
The context of relationship is dependent upon this correlation and 
co-dependency of man and Being. The need of each, informed by the 
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Buberian notion of relationship, provides the question of Being with the 
critically important element of "place". "My" positing of Being and Being's 
positing of "me" require one another and further, each is required to be 
posited, to be positioned, some-where. Through the relationship, Being and 
"I" provide each other with "place". Buber writes, "Certainly in order to be 
able to go out to the other you must have a starting place, you must have 
been, you must be, with yourself" (Buber, 1965, p. 21). 
It is important to stress here that this "setting at a distance", as one 
element in the construction of relationship, does not revert to an explication 
or articulation of one member of the relationship over and against another. 
The "setting at a distance" does not suggest a separateness of one over 
another. For Heidegger, "I" am separate from Being in order to provide the 
relationship. It is the "difference" which essentially constitutes relationship. 
A relationship as an expression of "difference" is founded on the notion of 
belonging. Heidegger points out, however, that belonging-together can 
provide additional understanding towards the question of Being if we stress 
the "belonging" and thereby indicate the "together" as a predicate. In the 
belonging "I" and Being are also together. 
It is this point, the notion of "place" in Heidegger's thinking, which 
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begins to illuminate how loneliness can be understood as a constitutive 
element to belonging, or, being-at-home-in-the-world. It may seem 
paradoxical, at first glance, to suggest that being-at-home-in-the-world 
would be dependent upon loneliness. Heidegger does insist that any 
being-in is always already an expression of being-with. We are always 
already with others in the world. However, to begin to ask the question of 
Being, to begin to think, requires, for Heidegger a separation from the world. 
This separation should not be considered as the traditional separation of 
Subject-Object in which "I" become a spectator of the world. Rather, the 
Heideggerian separation is dependent upon a separation between "earth" and 
"world" accomplished through the concept of work. In "my" work, whether 
as poet or laborer, "I" can establish "my" world built upon meaning and 
bringing the earth into a condition Heidegger calls "readiness-to-hand". By 
engaging in meaningful, "concernful" work, "I" bring about a separation 
distinguishing earth and world. In bringing world into focus "I" push earth 
into recession, becoming the background to "my" world and, in doing so, "I" 
position earth within the condition of "present-at-hand". 
The present-at-hand of the earth is the condition of the everyday 
man. By failing to engage in concernful work, man fails not only to bring the 
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earth to a readiness-at-hand, man also fails to constitute world. The failure 
to do so is a failure of differentiation. Failing to provide "depth" of 
perspective through the distinction of readiness-to-hand and present-at-
hand, man fails to construct a background of earth and the consequent 
foreground of world. In doing so, man also fails to provide context for a 
relationship in which it is constituted as an element within the 
readiness-to-hand. Work, as a meaning-making activity, indicates an 
engagement with world that is profoundly different from the surrounded-by 
which typifies man's lack of place in the lived world of the everyday. 
Engagement-with, as opposed to surrounded-by, indicates the "setting at a 
distance" which cannot be accomplished from the surrounded-by position of 
the everyday. The sense of place provided by the readiness-to-hand of "my" 
world stands in marked contrast to the no-place of the surrounding 
everyday earth. 
Along with the neglect of being, or, contributive to the neglect, is the 
failure of man to consider his "thrownness" and his impending "own death". 
Correlated with the neglect of being and thrownness, for Heidegger, is man's 
neglect of the being of intentionality. Turning to a discussion of these 
elements as contributive to the contemporary existential condition a better 
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understanding of the distortion of man's relationship with Being may 
emerge. Within all of this a sense of being-at-home-in-the-world may also 
emerge as a unique element of the realization of authentic relationship. 
Intentionality, for Heidegger, involves the notion of being-directed-
toward-itself, Heidegger cites Scheler's remark that "the essence of man is 
the intention towards something" (Heidegger, 1985. p. 130). Man, as a 
being-toward-itself, gains a "starting place" by being "set at a distance" from 
being. To complete Buber's conditions of relationship, man should now 
"come into relation" with Being. The "coming into relation", just as the 
"setting at a distance", liberates man and Being through the re-cognition of 
relationship. By coming into the relation, the setting at a distance is 
provided the element of "nearness". 
"Nearness" and "distance" represent critical concepts to the 
understanding of Heideggerian thinking. "Nearness", when understood as a 
relative condition of existence between "me" and Being expresses "my" 
contact with Being. The "contact with" remains an expression of distance yet 
now supplemented by a turning-towards Being and a being-turned-toward 
by Being in which a "coming to relation" begins. 
The turning-towards and being-turned-towards are described by 
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Heidegger as a "contiguous" relationship (Heidegger, 1968, p. 145). The 
contact which is the relationship of man to Being is contiguous because of the 
separation created by the readiness-to-hand. "Coming into relation", then, 
can be understood as the attendance to Being that comes from the 
re-cognition of intentionality. The "coming into relation" takes the "setting at 
a distance" and transforms the distance-from into a distance-to. In the 
coming into relation with Being man beings to dis-cover him-self at home 
with the world. It is in this relationship, Buber remarks, 
. . .  t h a t  h e r e  a n d  h e r e  a l o n e  a  b e i n g  h a s  a r i s e n  f r o m  t h e  w h o l e ,  
endowed and entitled to detach the whole as a world from himself and 
to make it an opposite to himself, instead of cutting out with his sense 
the part he needs from it, as all other beings do, and being content 
with that (Buber, 1965, p. 63). 
Man, in finding "place" within the relationship with Being, in setting 
apart earth from world, the present-at-hand to the readiness-to-hand, 
dis-covers what separates man from other living beings. It is in the 
loneliness of separation that man finds himself in man. Clark Moustakas 
writes, 
If the individual does not exercise his loneliness, one significant 
capacity and dimension of being human remains undeveloped, denied. 
A fear of despair, an agony of aloneness replaces the real experience 
but strategies of escape and alienation can never substitute for the 
growth-inducing, deepening values of a genuine, vital, lonely 
experience (Moustakas, p. 35). 
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Nearness, as an expression of distance-to rather than distance-from, 
supports the understanding of the necessity for loneliness. By considering 
the contiguity of nearness to Being as a condition of loneliness, loneliness can 
be further diffentiated from its frequent association with alienation. When 
"I" am lonely, "I" am lonely-with the world. Loneliness, the result of the 
positing of man with Being expresses a sense of being-here, or, Heidegger's 
Dasein. As a lonely man, man "knows " where he is. On the contrary, the 
contemporary "alienated" man has failed to perform the separation into 
readiness-to-hand. He has become, for Heidegger, Das Man, the Anyone. As 
The Anyone, man is as any-other. Heidegger further elaborates his position 
when he writes, 
We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as one takes pleasure and we 
read and judge about literature as one judges, we hear music as one 
hears music, we speak about something as one speaks (Heidegger, 
1985, P. 245). 
Rather than the loneliness of man with Being, The Anyone is lost-among the 
others who live in the everyday. In undifferentiated, suffocating contact 
with the Crowd, the Anyone is unable to engage-with being in a contiguous 
relationship. The Anyone, for Heidegger, is not the individual but rather a 
symbolic representative. 
In failing to differentiate man and Being and so re-cognize what it is 
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to be human, The Anyone is in a relationship which Heidegger typifies as an 
expression of "equality" or the "leveling off". This leveling off of the 
everyday removes man from the possibility for loneliness through the 
immersion of persistent being-in-the-midst of all other everyday men. 
Heidegger writes, 
Anything that departs from this commonness, in order to inhabit the 
formerly habitual proper speaking of language, is at once considered a 
violation of the standard. It is branded as a frivolous whim. All this 
is in fact quite in order, as soon as we regard the common as the only 
legitimate standard, and become generally incapable of fathoming the 
commonness of the common. This floundering in a commonness which 
we have placed under the protection of so-called natural common 
sense is not accidental, nor are we free to deprecate it. This 
floundering in commonness is part of the high and dangerous game 
and gamble in which, by the essence of language, we are the stakes 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 365). 
"Publicness", the Heideggerian concept of the mode in which the 
everyday reveals itself, stand in opposition to the private, or, lonely sphere 
of man and Being—together. This mode of the everyday, or, publicness, as 
the common sense of The Anyone, obliterates the private by defining and 
maintaining an oppositional, devalued mode of non-sense. In providing the 
realm of common sense with an explicitly invalid realm of non-sense, the 
possibility of a "face-to-face" is removed. 
The anonymity of The Anyone succeeds in appropriating the personal 
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sphere. It is paradoxical that the common sense of the everyday actually is 
predicated upon a selective, apportioned dispensation. It is critical that not 
everyone "have" common sense—that there are those who are non-sensical. 
The sense of belonging to the everyday, to the realm of The Anyone, is 
wholly dependent upon the exclusion created by the non-sensical. "My" 
belonging to the everyday requires that "I" surrender the loneliness which 
can provide a realization of my phenomenological authenticity. The common 
sense of the everyday is radically opposed to the other common sense of the 
Heraclitean logos which suggests a thinking which is binding, 
inter-connected, and, dependent upon the diversity of the individual. 
Contemporary common sense, as opposed to the pre-Socratic, depends 
upon the leveling off of The Anyone through the neglect of the question of 
Being. By validating a common sense which denies a personal relationship 
between man and Being, The Anyone assures its continuity. The perdurance 
of The Anyone, predicated upon the failure of separation of man from the 
Crowd, denies access to the opening through which man can set at a distance 
and come into relation with Being. By refusing this access, the individuation 
which is necessary for authentic relationship is precluded. Denied access to 
this essential loneliness, man, as The Anyone, falls into the alineated group. 
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The Anyone remains in the publicness that refuses "the insight that we do 
not reside sufficiently as yet where in reality we already are" (Heidegger, 
1969, p. 33). The "place" provided by loneliness is re-placed by the 
"no-place" of The Anyone. Rather than belonging, and in so doing, being 
together, we are as The Anyone and homeless. The perdurance of The 
Anyone, as dependent upon the common sense of publicness now brings this 
discussion to the fundamental Heideggerian concept of "thrownness" and 
with it, a consideration of the importance of an eschatological perspective. 
Man, as man, is always already in the world. As such, man finds 
himself in a condition of "thrownness". "I" am in my here (ness) condition, 
uninvited, and unaware of where "I" came from or where "I" am going. The 
consciousness of dislocation results in a refusal to understand "my" own 
identity. As thrown creatures we are unaware of our "place" in the world. 
Unsure of our beginnings, we tentatively grope for the unknown. The 
insistence of The Anyone for a common sense which eliminates the 
possibility for my relationship with Being can be understood, from a 
Heideggerian perspective, as a failure to come face-to-face with the anxiety 
of finality and death. In fact, the concept of The Anyone, as an anonymous 
entity, by definition denies the face-to-face and so refutes anxiety. 
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Understood by The Anyone as an inapropriate response, anxiety signals a 
failure of being-in-the-world. By refusing to come to grips with "my" own 
death and also refusing to consider the anxiety created by "my" death, "I" 
profoundly diminish the possibility for a relationship of man and Being. 
In considering the importance of eschatology to Heidegger it is 
essential to consider finality as an element which contributes to the concept 
of "care". As a critical concept for Heidegger, care is a fundamental element 
in Dasein. It is care, as care, that provides the presupposition for Dasein. 
Without care, whether as a caring for people or things, "my" individual 
existence becomes somewhat problematic. It is care that presupposes 
existence by providing for the possibility of connections between my-self 
and other things/people. Care can be expressed as a mode of being-with 
things/people which is a response to the anxiety over death. As a response 
to anxiety, care presupposes not only existence but also the possibility for 
the continuation of existence through apprehension. "I" cannot care for you 
without some anticipation of the future. "My" future, through care, is 
realized. The degree to which "my" response is a response to the anxiety of 
"my" death is the measure of my own authenticity. 
Authenticity, for Heidegger, is linked with a Dasein which has come 
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face-to-face with "my own" death. So long as an encounter with death is 
generalized as a consideration of death and not "my own" death, existence is 
less than authentic. Failure to "personalize" death, manifest in the mode of 
The Anyone which speaks of the "someday Everyone will die", 
de-emphasizes the significance of my unique death and thereby blurs the 
end point of "my" life. It is then possible for me to see my life as continual. 
Without this end point, and with the tranquilized in-acceptance of death as 
the death of Everyone, "my" life becomes continual. The never-ending 
assumption, the never-ending quality of the life of The Anyone is the 
fundamental refusal to consider the "possibility of the impossibility of my 
existence." In the refusal, the possibilities of my own existence are negated 
by my own consciousness. Heidegger writes, 
This certainty, that "I myself am in that I will die", is the basic 
certainty of Dasein itself. It is a genuine statement of Dasein, while 
"cogito sum" is only the semblance of such a statement. If such 
pointed formulations mean anything at all, then the appropriate 
statement pertaining to Dasein in its being would have to be "sum 
moribundus" ("I am in dying"), "mouribundus" not as someone gravely 
ill or wounded, but insofar as I am, I am "moribundus". The 
"moribundus" first gives the "sum" its sense (Heidegger, 1985, p. 
316-317). 
By encountering "my own" death, Heidegger holds that man 
establishes authenticity through the projection of a final point of personal 
existence. The authentic Dasein, with death confronted, is understood as the 
appropriation of Being in which "I" do not "have", but, rather am "in" Being. 
Heidegger writes, 
"I am" thus amounts to saying, I dwell, I abide in the world as with 
something familiar. Being as in-being and "I am" means dwelling 
with, and "in" primarily does not signify anything spatial at all but 
means primarily being familiar with (Heidegger, 1985, p. 158). 
In-dwelling, being-familiar-with, requires that the authentic Dasein serve as 
connector between birth and death and, as such, establish a context of a 
"life-span". The confrontation of "my own" death and the subsequent 
authentication of Dasein contribute to the realization of life-span by 
accounting for Heidegger's thrownness. It is important to consider the 
significance of realizing the thrownness of existence. As thrown creatures, 
we realize our-selves in existence—we are here. In doing so, there also 
occurs "my" response to the call from Being. 
Realizing "my" thrownness, when understood as the shock of 
being-here is similar to the sense of waking suddenly at night, finding 
my-self here, surrounded by the darkness, unaware of "where" "I" had been 
in the im-mediate prior moment. "I" was not here only to suddenly "find" 
my-self here. The gasp of surprise, the in-breath of thrownness, however, 
gives way to the sigh, or outbreath, of the silent response to the call from 
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Being. The call from Being implores man, through the acknowledgement of 
thrownness, to seek life. It is that moment between the in and the out 
breath, Heidegger's "moment of vision", which is co-dependent upon the 
connection of thrownness to the drawnness to the call from Being. That 
moment of vision provides for the "fundamental character of being of 
Dasein" which is "first adequately grasped in the determination, an entity 
which is in the to-be-it-at-its-time" (Heidegger, 1985, p. 153). 
Acknowledging my-self as thrown, and through the confrontation of 
the anxiety of "my own" death, responding to the call from Being, requires 
that "I" be the nexus between the motion of being-thrown and the motion of 
being-drawn by Being. When not interrupted by the authentic and ecstatic 
confrontation with "my own" death, the motion of thrownness becomes the 
momentum of "fallenness"—the drop into the existential abyss. The "falling" 
and the "whirlwind" of the Dasein of The Anyone indicate a sense of 
movement without source. The absence of source, the neglect of being of 
intentionality, is made manifest by these considerations of movement. Being 
thrown, being whirled about are profound states of being-out-of-place. 
Understood as a failure to be-in-place, to be-at-home, thrownness is rescued 
in the response to the call from Being. 
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"The tranquilizing of fallenness", Heidegger writes, "is not a matter of 
standing still in its movement but rather involves a creeping intensification" 
(Heidegger, 1985, p. 281). The movement of being-drawn implies a sense of 
position, of being-here so that "1" might be "underway". The tranquilizing of 
fallenness, the whirlwind of the everyday indicate a dis-orientation that can 
only be recoverd and transformed as a being-towards-itself by responding 
to the call. The authentic relationship of being-thrown and being-drawn can 
be further informed by the Heraclitean concept of becoming as the 
coalescence of non-being and being. 
The call from Being rescues man from the fall into non-being, and, 
responding to the call, man continues being. The call and the response then 
can be understood as a reciprocal and mutually dependent relationship. To 
the extent that man fails to respond to the call, he not only continues as a 
being thrown, he also diminshes his being itself. By failing to respond, Being 
fails in its calling. Having recognized himself from a being-thrown to a 
being-drawn, man is then positioned (as mediator) to realize the dynamics of 
thrownness/drawnness and to be circumspected by Being. It is important to 
understand that thrownness cannot be dismissed as a social aberration or 
"mis-understanding" which can be "resolved". Neither thrownness nor 
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in-authenticity are concepts which can be "resolved" but must be understood 
as constituent elements of Being. 
Positing my-self between being thrown and being drawn, "I" can "see" 
my-self as mediator and constructor of the life-span in which "my" 
experiences will and have been. Enveloped by the motion of thrownness and 
drawnness, an authentic relationship with Being results in the re-cognition of 
existential loneliness. Confrontation of "my own" death, being thrown, being 
drawn, all contribute to the uniquely personal condition which enables "me" 
to be-"me"-in-"my"-time. These elements must be self-referential in order 
that the authenticity of each is confirmed and the life-span is the span of 
individual birth-to-death rather than a generalized life-style of The Anyone. 
Existential loneliness, for Heidegger, is the understanding of 
self-reference as crucial to the fundamentally personal experiences of 
authentic existence. As mediator of thrownness/drawnness, "I" re-member 
the present in the Heideggerian sense of a "gathering together" of past and 
future into "my" being-with-Being. For Heidegger, the urgency of the 
eschatological perspective reveals the personalized life-span as the structure 
of the horizon in which "I" must dis-cover my-self and "place" my-self in 
time. 
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Thrownness and drawnness can then be understood as ways of being 
in the stream of consciousness. Heraclitus writes that a man cannot place his 
foot in the same stream twice. The "same stream", as stream of 
consciousness and in flux, must always present a new stream through man's 
inquiries. Intentionality, for Heidegger, rescues the self from fallenness by 
transforming thrownness into drawnness. Through intentionality, the 
life-span unites thrownness and drawnness and provides a "place" in which 
"I" can be, where "I" was, and where "I" will be. 
The life-span, like the separation of earth and world, requires the 
setting at a distance and coming into relation so that "my" time, or, the 
personal, might be sorted out from the continual, or, universal. In 
establishing a personal item as "my" life, life-span becomes a grid for 
being-it-at-its time. Life-span, the grid including thrownness, drawnness, 
and death, is the horizon through which "I" travel. As such, it is the 
permanence of "me" coming-towards-my-own-death. It is extrapolation 
which allows eternal time to pass through "me". Considering life-span as a 
grid for "me" provides for a "place" excerpted without the universal where 
"I" can be-at-home. It is the "place" from which "I" come as well as the 
"place" through which "I" pass. 
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The life-span also provides for a consideration of the roles of 
immanence and transcendence. By considering a life as a span, the concept 
implies a bridging or connection from one point, the beginning, to a final 
point, death. As a bridge, a life-span connects "my" beginning to "my" end, 
and, in so doing, illuminates the co-dependency upon each element as 
correlative elements for being-in-the-world. As Heidegger writes, 
The bridge swings over the stream with ease and power. It does not 
just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks 
only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge designedly causes 
them to lie across from each other (Heidegger. 1971, p. 152). 
The life-span provides the "place" through which "I" travel in a mundane 
sense as well as the "place" through which "I" travel towards "my" death. 
Transcendence, understood through the metaphor of life-span, 
involves a travel or crossing that is not so much a traveling-out or over as a 
traveling-through-and-towards. Transcendence connects "me" with Being as 
"I" re-cognize that "I" am only fully "me" upon the completion of life-span. 
Not until "my" death completes the structure of life-span can "I" become 
fully "me". "My" immanence is dis-covered by "my" death, in the completion 
of "my" life-span and the absorption of "me" into Being. Transcendence, as 
the intentional being-directed-towards-itself, is realized when the self is 
completed—at (its) "my" death. 
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If life-span can be understood as a preliminary "homing" process by 
which "I" construct the place for my life, it is important to turn to the 
encounters within this construct. "Place," wrote Heidegger, "is the where of 
the belonging of what is handy or on hand in concern" (Heidegger, 1985, p. 
226). Looking at how "belonging" occurs in a place called life-span requires 
that the discussion consider "my" encounters with things and people within 
this region. Heidegger considers being-in as an implicit expression of 
being-with. 
It is only insofar as Dasein as being-in-the-world has the basic 
constitution of being-with that there is a being-for and -against and 
-without-one-another right to the indifferent walking-alongside-one-
another (Heidegger, 1985, p. 241). 
Despite the inherent being-with residing with being-in, Heidegger 's 
concern with individual death as a foundation for authenticity prevents his 
comprehensive consideration of "my" relationships with other people. He 
writes, 
Only when we walk it, and in no other fashion, only, that is, by 
thoughtful questionning, are we on the move on the way. That the 
way of thought is of this precursoriness in turn depends on an 
enigmatic solitude, taking the word "solitude" in a high, unsentimental 
sense (Heidegger, 1958, p. 169). 
As Roger Waterhouse writes, "Inauthenticity as the gap between feeling and 
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self-for-others.. .was to be dealt with by getting our own self-relationship 
right" (Waterhouse, p. 191). While Heidegger's thoughts on relationships 
with others, particularly as the reflection of the control of The Anyone, are 
important to consider, it is also helpful to consider the works of Buber and 
Edmund Husserl. By contrasting Buber's thoughts on the "between" and 
Husserls concerns with inter-subjectivity, a more comprehensive inquiry of 
the encounters within a life-span can be developed. 
Buber writes, "We do not find meaning lying in things nor do we put it 
in things but between us and things it can happen" (Buber, 1965. p. 36). 
Between "us" and things, for Buber, provides the medium through which "I" 
can confirm and be confirmed as an element of the I-Thou. Through the 
confirmation of I and Thou, as the setting at a distance and coming into 
relation, "my" identity is developed and with this the concept of community, 
of being-with-others, is established. "Collectivity", wrote Buber, "is based on 
an organized atrophy of personal existence, community on its increase and 
confirmation in life lived towards one another" (Buber, 1965, p. 31). 
The lived life finds its source, for Buber, in the diversity of 
membership and participation of its particulars, or, individuals. In this way, 
the concept of "individual" is understood as fundamental to the concept of 
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"community". Within "my" life-span, community, or, belongings-with, is 
dependent upon the diversity provided through the individuals who are 
co-present. "Community" is defined by its membership rather than the 
contrary. In the Heideggerian sense of belonging and, therefore, 
being-together, "community" for Buber represents the intimate connections 
of individuals who constitute the relationships contributing to a sense of 
belonging. That sense of belonging, of being-at-home, results from these 
connections which construct meaning and consequently depict world. Both 
the "collectivity" of Buber and Heidegger's The Anyone represent the results 
of an emphasis upon the leveling off or the equalization of difference, in this 
case, understood as personal identity. 
For Buber, however, distancing of the Other through the designation of 
The Anyone offers no access to making meaning out of the world or a world 
out of meaning. As a "de-signation", The Anyone sets out, or, outlines the 
Other in such a way as to prevent the additional and critical coming into 
relation. By casting the Other in the light of The Anyone, Heidegger fails to 
account for the importance of inter-human consitution of world. Including 
The Anyone with the earth to be set apart from world excludes the Other, as 
individual, to assist in "my" own confirmation. By denying the Other access 
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to "my" world, "I" negate his possibility of existence as well as "my" own. 
Heidegger's "primal quilt", as a failure to realize "my own" Dasein should not, 
according to Buber, exclude others from "my" being-in-the-world. Buber 
writes, 
He (Heidegger) is right to say that we are able to discover a primal 
guilt. But we are not able to do this by isolating a part of life, the part 
where the existence is related to itself and to its own being, but by 
becoming aware of the whole life without reduction, the life in which 
the individual, in fact, is essentially related to something other than 
himself (Buber, 1965. p. 166). 
Heidegger writes that "in order to be equal to the question of Being, 
we simply have to risk asking the question" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 165)- For 
Buber, however, the significance of the risk is the risk of encounter with 
others. Failing to take the risk of inter-subjective encounter fails to fully 
come to terms with the lived world. 
What the Other provides is the opposite of the Heideggerian The 
Anyone. While The Anyone seeks the common sense of equalization through 
the loss of difference, the Other presents the contours, or, negative space 
against which "my" self is formed. The difference of the Other is implicit 
within the designation. As the Other, "you" are different from "me". The 
realm of The Anyone provides a realm of familiarity, of absorption, in which 
"I" may be lost to The Anyone. Familiarity, cast as a way of being of The 
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Anyone, presents a ubiquitous calm which tranquilizes, causing man to 
forget the question of Being. The danger of the familiar, for Heidegger, rests 
in the potential for a loss of self to The Anyone. 
For Buber, however, it is the Other who provides the differentiation 
which is necessary for self-realization. He writes, "If everything concrete is 
equally near, equally nearest, life with the world ceases to have articulation 
and structure, it ceases to have meaning" (Buber, 1965, p. 23). Meaning 
involves inter-subjective turning to the Other so that "we" might agree upon 
a world. Language, as the between of the I-Thou relationship, becomes in a 
non-pejorative sense, a "corn-promise" of reality. You" and "I", through 
language, agree to a world and in the agreement arising from the 
face-to-face confrontation, "we" com-promise one another's existence. In the 
turning to the Other, "I" come from "my" place towards the place from which 
"you" come. In the turning the familiarity that is "my" home-place comes 
face-to-face with the familiarity of "your" home-place and the encounter 
produces "our" world. 
Failure to come to this "com-promise", or Buber's Dialogue, risks a 
profound loss. The failure to construct, participate, and so perpetuate 
Dialogue is equivalent to the failure to construct, participate, and perpetuate 
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the lived world. Buber writes that by failing to turn to the Other "dialogue 
becomes a fiction, the mysterious intercourse between two human worlds 
only a game, and in the rejection of the real life confronting him the essence 
of all reality begins to disintegrate" (Buber, 1965, p. 24). 
Buber's Dialogue suggests a co-constructed reality, or agreed-upon 
world, in which "you" and "I" can be. As co-constructors of "our" world, 
"you" and "I" become involved in the attempt to establish one world through 
which experiences can then be compared and related. Language provides 
the avenue of the between through which "we" can inter-subjectively 
com-promise one world. As Husserl writes, 
The objective world as an idea—the ideal correlate of an 
intersubjective (intersubjectively communalized) experience, which 
ideally can be and is carried on as constantly harmonious—is 
essentially related to an intersubjectivity (itself constituted as having 
the ideality of endless openness), whose component particular subjects 
are equipped with mutually correspondent and harmonious 
constitutive systems (Husserl, pp. 107-108). 
The Other, as "my" Other, presents to "my" world the possibility of 
an-other world. By providing "my" Here with a There, the Other serves a 
fundamental role in the differentiation of "me" and world. As Other to "me", 
the relationship is not concluded for Husserl, as it is for Heidegger, with the 
oppositional and potentially absorbing The Anyone. Husserl writes, 
.. .in the sense of a community of men and in that of man—who, even 
as solitary, has the sense: member of a community—there is implicit 
a mutual being for one another,which entails an Objectivating 
equalization of my existence with that of all others—consequently: I, 
or anyone else, as a man among other men (Husserl, 1960, p. 129). 
For Husserl, the Other, as co-related to "me", does not preclude "my" 
authentic being but assists in determining "my" world by providing 
connections—between "me" and "you", "my" world and "yours". These 
relationships, as connections, are predicated upon the "necessity of only one 
Objective world." 
Just as the Other cannot exist absolutely, that is, without "my" 
intervention as his Other, "1", as the Other to "you", cannot exist 
in-dependently. "My" "I", as an absolute subjective "I", cannot be known by 
me as this would require the objectification of this "I" by "me". "I" know "I" 
am here by the manner in which the Other "behaves" in "my" presence. The 
Other, behaving "as if" "I" am here, confirms me as being here, by his being 
there. As Theunissen writes, "according to Husserl, to grasp myself as a 
human being amounts to nothing other than to allow oneself to be fitted in 
as one worldly object among other worldly objects" (Theunissen, p. 33). The 
loneliness of Heidegger's authentic being is not removed by either Buber or 
Husserl. However, the loneliness that serves for Heidegger as the necessary 
breaking away, or, separation from earth, provides for Buber and Husserl the 
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co-relational quality necessary for Dialogue or inter-subjectivity. "My" 
loneliness connects "me" with "you" to the degree in which "you" are 
"analogized" by "me". 
Through the concept of an "analogue" Husserl attempts to explain how 
"I" can come to know some-one as any-one other than "me". If the world, as 
Schopenhaur suggests, is my idea, how does "my" idea include what or who 
is not me? Husserl writes, 
That my own essence can be at all contrasted for me with something 
else, or that I (who I am) can become aware of someone else (who is 
not I but someone other than I), presupposes that not all my own 
modes of consciousness are modes of my self-consciousness (Husserl, 
p. 105). 
In the "analogizing" of the Other,'!" know him to be not-me. But, even 
this knowing as not-me is dependent upon the familiar "me". Knowing "my" 
Other as not-me is also an expression of knowing "my" Other as "me". The 
centrality of the "I" within "my" world must somehow accomodate the 
un-familiar not-I in order to offer the setting at a distance necessary to 
establish a relationship between "me" and world. 
Reason, for Husserl, provides an impulse in which the un-familiar can 
be explained as a confrontation with the un-familiar as not-me, or, alien. 
Husserl writes that,. .reason is not an accidental de facto ability, not a title 
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for possible accidental matters of fact, but rather a title for an all-embracing 
structural form belonging to all trascendental subjectivity" (Husserl, p. 57). 
Reason, as an "all-bracing structural form" is the expression of intentionality 
directed towards "one objective world". 
The search for "harmony" as the "one objective world" leads to a 
condition which Husserl decribes as. 
.. .something that exists is in intentional communion with something 
else that exists. It is an essentially unique connectedness, an actual 
community and precisely the one that makes transcendentally 
possible the being of a world, a world of men and things (Husserl, p. 
129). 
This "actual community" exists because of its constitution of self in an 
intentional and mediate relationship with the Other on the basis of the 
harmony of reason. Through the harmony provided by reason as "one 
objective world", "I" am provided an additional element within "my" place to 
be. The "actual community", predicated upon the "harmonizing of monads" 
includes "me", in fact, is co-dependent upon "me" with the Other. The world 
becomes impossible without "me"—place is dependent upon "me". "You" 
and "I" fit together and, in so doing, construct a world. 
The dependency upon reason for "my" fitting in and with "my" world 
is similar to Immanuel Kant's thoughts on the a priori in which "I" attempt to 
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match my "form of thought" with the "form of life". In Kant's teleological 
model, man's fit is related to the degree to which he participates in the 
progressive evolutionary development towards Being. By presenting a 
teleologically-driven concept of Being, Kant provides for the possibility of a 
developmental and progressive relationship between man and Being. Fraser, 
in his Of Time. Passion, and Knowledge, cites Kant's idea that,.. what is 
chaotic in a single individual may be seen from the standpoint of the human 
race as a whole to be a steady progression through slow evolution of its 
original endowment" (Fraser, 1975, p. 37). 
Man's fit in and with a world, for Buber, Husserl, and Kant, is a process 
requiring the construction, maintenance, and continuation of relationships 
with others. For Buber, "I" am at home in an I-Thou relationship founded 
upon reciprocity in which "we are bound up in relation to the same center" 
(Buber, 1965, p. 21). For Husserl, the "harmony of monads" is dependent 
upon the form of reason which brings the "I" and the Other together as 
world. For Kant, "my" place in the world is found in the search for "good" 
and treating others as "ends" rather than "means". 
For Heidegger, loneliness serves to separate "me" from the world in 
the attempt to come face-to-face with "my own" death. The eschatological 
63 
imperative of Heidegger's concept of the question of Being all but precludes a 
consideration of being-with in any terms other than as part of The Anyone. 
In summary, the eschatological perspective of Heidegger's thought provides 
an opportunity to consider existence not as a "what" but as a "way to be". 
The necessity for the "moment of vision" based on the urgency of 
appropriation before "my" death, leads Heidegger to an investigation of 
language, especially poetry, as the "way to be" through which man comes to 
the "clearing". While Heidegger provides little place for the Other as "I" 
separate my-self from world, poetry offers insights as to how "I" might 
be-at-home with loneliness. 
Turning to Heidegger's thoughts on poetry in the following chapter 
and keeping Buber's contributions on relationship in mind, offers an 
opportunity to examine the unique relationship developed between a poet 
and his world. By also considering the works of Rainer Maria Rilke and 
Professor Ross Mooney, along with other philosopher-poets, the discussion 
follows Karsten Harries suggestion that "unable to establish man's place, 
transcendental philosophy raised a demand that only poetry and myth can 
answer" (Murray, p. 79). 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PHENOMENA OF POETIC THOUGHT 
In Poetrv. Language. Thought. Heidegger asks, "What Are Poets For?". 
His answer, based upon his notions of the "destitution" of our times, indicates 
a need for man to become more human. Man, as the result of his 
development of the world through scientific thinking, has come to believe 
himself to be the master of his environment. In seeking to explain the 
world, scientific man has set himself apart from the world and, in failing to 
come into relation, has failed to consummate a relationship with world. "The 
higher its consciousness, the more conscious being is excluded from the 
world" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 108). By standing apart from the world, man, as 
scientific observer, sees the world and, through the appropriation of 
language, adjusts the world to scientific predisposition. The scientific 
observer, sees the world and, through the appropriation of language, adjusts 
the world to a scientific predisposition. Scientific thought, as a form of 
ex-planation, from the Latin ex (out) planare (plane, level), tends to "level 
off" or flatten out" the world so that prior and subsequent explanations can 
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be made to "fit" together. 
Explanation, to be considered viable, must conform to or, at least, refer 
to a prior explanation and, in turn, be re-formed into subsequent 
explanation. This process of con-formation has the effect of con-forming 
language itself so that experiences of the world are adjusted to the 
explanatory language. By being selective with the language of explanation, 
the world, too, is simplified. 
"Where Nature is not satisfactory to man's representation, he reframes 
or redisposes it", Heidegger writes (Heidegger, 1971, p. 110). This 
"refraining" through a re-naming of the things of the world, as scientific 
explanation, represents a dramatically different approach to language, and, 
to the subsequent construction of world, than does poetic thinking. 
"Reframing" the world, with scientific language, fails to consider the frame of 
relationship between man and being. Using language, rather than being used 
by language, man "names" the world and its constituent things and fails to 
grow silent, to listen to the call of being. Unable to "take the world to heart" 
and "let things be", scientific man confronts the world with continual 
description-of as explanation-for. 
Failing to consider this fundamental relationship and supplanting this 
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relationship with the re-framed relationship in which man stands in 
opposition to world may negate the possibility for dialogue between man 
and man, and, therefore, between man and being. Heidegger writes, "The 
man of the age of technology, by his parting, opposes himself to the Open. 
This parting is not a parting from, it is a parting against" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 
116). 
Establishing the relationship between himself and being as 
oppositional, man seeks meaning and constructs a world lacking his own 
presence. Scientific man, as the "dis-interested" observer, is homeless in that 
he perpetuates a world that is only "for", never "within" him. A function of 
this explanation-for quality of scientific thought is the pre-supposition 
within the language of science of world order and the discovery of this order. 
Scientific thought, through explanation, seeks to present a world of constancy 
and permanance. As Marc Belth suggests, there is a dramatic difference 
between the use of language to describe and to explain, and, language that is 
itself a forming or creative process. "The one (explanation)", he writes, "is 
concerned to make coherent the world about us. The other is concerned to 
illuminate the "world" within ourselves, and the "world" within the world" 
(Belth, p. 97). Understood in this way, it is possible to conceive of the 
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scientific as an expression of poetic conjecture. It is possible that the poetic 
mataphor, as a process of forming or creating precedes and informs the 
"world" of scientific thought by providing a model of scientific consideration. 
The absurdity of poetic thought, the demand for what Belth calls the 
"playfullness" of poetic thinking can be understood as necessarily antecedent 
to scientific explanation. 
Critical to the process of poetic thinking, and subsequently to scientific 
thought, is the quality of suggestion or allusion. Allusion, (from the Latin 
alludere to play with), provides power to poetic thinking. By "playing" with 
the world, poetic thinking assumes the license to suggest other "worlds", 
other variations of the "one objective world." Considering poetic and 
scientific thought in this manner provides an understanding of thinking that 
is not the dualistic poetic or scientific but rather is the dialectical 
poetic-scientific. "Explaining" and "playing with" become expressions of the 
setting at a distance and coming into relation with the world. Explaining, 
allows the world to be distinguished from "me". Allusion, on the other hand, 
offers the conduit through which "I" can engage a world and in so doing 
re-form that world by suggesting variations through poetic discourse. Belth 
writes, 
. . .  a r t ,  t h e n ,  i s  s o m e  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  m a n ' s  s h a p i n g  t h o s e  f e e l i n g s  a n d  
perceptions that arise from his immediate involvements with the 
observables and unobservables of his world. It is the expression of 
his passion before he explains it... (Belth, p. 98). 
It is this "expression of passion ", as poetic thinking, which provides 
insight into the necessity for poetic loneliness. As the initial setting at a 
distance not only of poet and world but of poet and mankind, both world and 
man can be appropriated through the construction of relationship. The poet, 
separated from the "one objective world", begins the Heideggerian "venture". 
"As ventured", Heidegger writes, "those who are not protected are 
nevertheless not abandoned" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 103). The venture 
suggests that poets precede other men with their willingness to be 
unprotected in their relationship with the suffering of the world. As 
unprotected men, poets become open to being through their openness to the 
suffering within existence. It is his willingness to be ventured, to become 
open to his unique loneliness, which enables the poet to create a new world, 
to play with and suggest, through allusion, an alternative. In doing so, the 
poet not only transforms the world but is himself, transformed. Belth writes, 
"Every new poem is a rebellion against seeing myself and the world in the 
habituated ways. In every poem the poet creates himself anew, and holds in 
his imagery the same promise for those who read" (Belth, p. 123). 
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The "rebellion" against habituation is the engagement-with of the poet 
and a world versus the observation-of the scientist and the world. In his 
rebellion, the poet constitutes both himself and his world in the construction 
and maintenance of the relationship between poet and world. Contrary to 
this, the scientist, with his presupposed world, is barred from all allusion 
leading to transformation and is provided a world only for modification in 
the sense of reference-to rather than transformation-of. As ventured, as 
being lonely and open to suffering, the poet provides the potential for his 
own renewal as well as the renewal of world. For the poet, the world, too, is 
ventured, and in the creation arising from that venture, both poet and world 
are united. 
The "things" of the world, as elements of world, are subject to 
transformation through poetic intervention. For both Martin Heidegger and 
for Rainer Maria Rilke, the "thing" is of central importance to a poetic making 
sense out of the world. When Rilke asks in his Ninth Elegy, "Why then the 
necessity to be human-", his answer follows-"... because earthly existence 
means much, and because apparently everything here needs us, this fleeting 
reality which strangely concerns us." The earth "needs" man, and of greater 
importance, it "apparently" needs man. Things, for their appearance, to 
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become present, need man. Rilke suggests that the things not only need 
man, but need man to understand them "as even the things themselves 
never dared to imagine." Man's reason-to-be is not only to perceive and 
thereby provide presence through the appearance of things, but to penetrate 
appearance through transformation. To "think the things", for Rilke, is first 
to constitute a world from earth and then to transcend this world by 
knowing the things through the infusion of meaning. When Rilke writes of 
the "inexpressible things", he adds, they can only be expressed as "an 
acquired world". It is the "naming" of a thing which provides potential 
connections—both the connection between an individual and the thing 
named as well as the connection between individuals through the 
communication of the former "inexpressible" now "named". "Perhaps we are 
here", Rilke writes, to "say". 
Rilke's "saying" is similar to Heidegger's "worlding of a world" in which 
a distinction is established between world and earth. Heidegger writes in 
"The Origin of the Work of Art", 
. . .  t h e  w o r l d  i s  t h e  s e l f - o p e n i n g  o p e n n e s s  o f  t h e  b r o a d  p a t h s  o f  t h e  
simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical people. 
The earth is the spontaneous furthering of that which is continually 
self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing (Heidegger, 
1977, p. 172). 
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Earth serves both Heidegger and Rilke as a background from which a 
"world" can be constructed. The construction of this world, manifested in 
things, involves for Heidegger and Rilke, the penetration to the "thingness" of 
the thing. The recession through the suppression of earth, with the 
highlighting of a world and Heidegger's indication of a "historical people" 
suggests a distinction between the universal and the personal which 
redeems both. As Michael Oakeshott writes, 
As civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an enquiry 
about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of 
information, but of a conversation begun in the primeval forests and 
made more articulate in the course of centures" (Oakeshott, p. 11). 
Earth, from this perspective, is analogous to the universal and the 
foundational, while world can be compared with the individual and the 
personal. Heidegger's "worlding of the world" is understood as a process of 
personalizing the universal by meaning-making through thematic 
connections. Personalizing, as worlding, involves for both Heidegger and 
Rilke, an effort for stability, for homeostasis, in a world of things 
representative of personal meaning from experience. "The soul", Dilthey 
wrote, "while perturbed by the persistent change of impressions, of fates, 
and of the power of the outside world, must strive for inner stability in 
order better to withstand it ail" (Dilthey, p. 28). 
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For both Heidegger and Rilke, the things are the stuff on which this 
inner stability must rest. By recession of earth and accentuation of world, 
depth is provided against which the things are given presence. The things, 
as the stuff for a stable world, are also, for both men, threatened by the 
advent of technology. 
Technology, as a way of knowing, is described by Rilke—"Between the 
hammers our heart endures, like the tongue between the teeth, which yet 
continues to praise." The hammers of technology, as the hardness of the 
object (versus the thing), are poised to crush the softness of the tongue. By 
posing the potential for silencing the tongue which speaks from the heart, 
technology, for Rilke, is preparing a time without "saying", a time in which 
silence is not the absence of sound but the absence of the potential for 
sound. Technology's danger lies in its objectification of the thing, preventing 
an authentic dialectical relationship between the humanness of man and the 
thingness of the thing. It is the "taking to heart" and "letting be" of poetic 
thinking which technology rejects. Implicit within this rejection, and 
analagous to the diminishment of "world", is the loss of the realization of 
self-potential. By relieving the thing of its thingness, the potential for 
self-realization is also diminished resulting in the realization of Heidegger's 
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The Anyone, or Nietzschs The Crowd. Unable to dis-cover the thingness 
slumbering within the thing, man too, remains concealed. 
Rilke, in the sixth stanza writes, "more than ever before the things 
which can be experienced are vanishing, for what is crowding out and 
replacing them is an act without image." Comparing this with Nietzsche's 
"the image is a kind of consciousness" leads to the conclusion that as the 
things vanish so vanishes the potential for action with images. At stake is 
the dynamism of construction and transformation of world which is 
enlivened by the diversity of the things. The diminishment of the things qua 
earth must also for Rilke, result in the diminishment or shrinkage of world. 
In effect, as the things vanish, the structure of the horizon of consciousness 
is progressively restricted. Consciousness, dependent upon earth-things, has 
less and less to retrieve leaving man more and more an un-conscious being. 
Along with Rilke s vanishing of the things, Heidegger suggests the separation 
of art and technology as an "error" of technological thinking. (Heidegger uses 
"error" in the sense of erring, to be on the wrong way) Heidegger writes, 
. . .  t h e  o b j e c t - c h a r a c t e r  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d o m i n i o n  s p r e a d s  i t s e l f  o v e r  
the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly, and completely. Not only 
does it establish all things producible in the process of production; it 
also delivers the products of production by means of the market. In 
self-assertive production, the humanness of man and the thingness of 
things dissolves... (Heidegger, 1971, p. 115). 
7 4  
Technology, as a type of knowing which casts things as terminal 
objects, prohibits the "saying" of things that is their thingness. Even more, 
technology prohibits an understanding resulting from saying "in such a way 
as even the things themselves never dared to imagine to be." 
With the advent of technology, language became unable to "say" the 
things, and, in so doing, unable to constitute that relationship between man 
and things from which "world" emerges. For Heideggar, who uses "memory" 
as a gathering, the diminishment of earth-things provides the potential for a 
loss of memory, a forgetfulness which impacts the future. Future, 
understood in terms of protention is stripped by the restriction of past, or, 
memory. Future is truncated with the narrowing of the things to be 
gathered. The thing, in this context, is significantly jeopardized and, as such, 
so is time. 
Poetic thinking, however, can "say" the things and so provide a future. 
As Ross Mooney writes, 
They (artists) will be able to change the past. As the future is sensed, 
emerging into the now, it brings with it the power and requirement to 
alter the past so that the past is free to enter into the flow of the now. 
.. So the past is not past-for-ever, but the past-for-now, and in the 
now it takes on new form" (Mooney, "The Artist and Our Human Need, 
1979, p. 14). 
Poetic thinking, by saying the things, can also provide the sense of the 
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past-perfect or the ought-to-have-been as a means of subjectively 
transforming the past. By casting the past in the ought-to-have-been, the 
poet can alter the "was" and re-member the past as a re-flection of his 
present. 
The things, threatened by technology, and generally, "modernization", 
are in Rilke's words, in need of "rescue". Because of the pervasiveness of 
technology, the "rescue" of the things requires that modern man 
re-members, gathers his thought together, and in doing so, re-collects a 
world. As such, the rescue of the things is also a rescue of man from a 
pervasive alienation within the modern world. Alienation, as a static 
subject-object dualism, is expressed as the "unconscious One." The 
remembrance of the dialectical nature of the person-thing relationship is a 
Heideggerian form of "rescue". It is a thinking that, for Heidegger, "is the 
step back from the thinking that merely represents—that is, explains—to the 
thinking that responds and recalls" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 181). Heidegger 
writes in Building. Dwelling. Thinking. 
. . .  m a n  a c t s  a s  t h o u g h  h e  w e r e  t h e  s h a p e r  a n d  m a s t e r  o f  l a n g u a g e ,  
while in fact language remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before 
all else man's subversion of this relation of dominance that drives his 
nature into alienation" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 146). 
The thing, in need of rescue, is the mediator between world and earth, and 
as such, between the univeral and the personal. It is also a mediation 
between the familiar and the un-familiar which grounds meaning. 
The familiar, as earth, and the un-familiar, as world, are distinguished 
by their relationships with the "I". As "I" experience and explain the 
un-familiar they, too, recede to earth as familar. In this way, the tension 
between earth and world results from the synthesis of experience. Where 
this mediation occurs, for Heidegger and Rilke, is "in" language. Heidegger 
writes, "Language goes on as the taking place or occurring of dif-ference for 
world and things" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 207). For Rilke, this "taking place" is 
an expression of "here". Rilke's "here" and Heidegger's "clearing" are 
analagous concepts essential to the rescue of things, the rescue of world, and 
ultimately the rescue of man. 
Heidegger claims the clearing "grants the movement of speculative 
thinking the passage though what it thinks." It is the place taken by 
language as the place for this mediation, is also the place for rescue of these 
"destitute times." Through the clearing, 
. . .  w e  m a y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  d a y  w i l l  c o m e  w h e n  w e  w i l l  n o t  s h u n  t h e  
question whether the opening, the free open, may not be that within 
which alone pure space and ecstatic time and everything present and 
absent in them have the place which gathers and protects everything 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 305). 
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The clearing, as the "now" of pure space and ecstatic time can be compared 
with Rilke's "just once, everything, just one time." Rilke continues, "But to 
have existed this once, even if only one time, to have existed here on earth, 
appears irrevocable." 
There are two elements essential for understanding the existential 
correlation between Heidegger's "clearing" and Rilke's "here"—the moment 
and suffering. As part of the constituent elements of the existential 
experience, these concepts supply the connections between the epoche and 
poesis. 
Both the "clearing" and "here" consider the moment as both revelatory 
and horrible. The revelation of the moment as moment is the sense of 
stillness and stability amidst a frenetic and dynamic earth. Stillness, as a 
result of "saying" the thingness of a thing, provides important images for 
Heidegger and Rilke including "sound", "silence", and "invisibility." By saying 
the thing, we can in effect, seize the moment. As an ecstatic action, the 
moment is realized as a relationship constitued by "me" and the things. 
Heidegger says that the "dif-ference" between earth and world, as the 
moment of the clearing takes place, in language. Only by thinking of 
language as the "house of being" can we once more begin to think. 
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"Science", writes Heidegger, "does not think". In fact, "most thought 
provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking" 
(Heidegger, 1968, p. 6). Language, by labelling the things, provides the relief 
between earth and world and the suspension called the moment. 
It is important to understand how "saying" and "silence" are co-related 
for Heidegger and Rilke. The saying, as a response to the thingness of a 
thing, begins from silence. To hear the call of the things of being, for 
Heidegger, requires that we first come to being in silence. 
The call is a directive which, in calling to and calling upon, in reaching 
out and inviting, directs us toward an action or nonaction, or toward 
something even more essential. In every calling, a call has already 
gathered (Heidegger, 1968, p. 124). 
Heidegger and Rilke frequently associate the moment with references of 
stillness and silence. Heidegger writes that"... the clearing, the open region, 
is not only free for brightness and darkness but also for resonance and echo, 
for around and the diminshing of sound" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 384). In the 
clearing, between world and earth saying the things is to find yourself in 
silence. 
The silence of listening for the call and the response to the call do not 
require a vocal response. For both Heidegger and Rilke, the realization of the 
moment as the essential place for being-with-being is a place reached 
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through language that transcends "daily chatter". It is chatter, the daily 
discourse of The Anyone, that precludes a saying of silence. Heidegger 
writes, "everyday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem" 
(Heidegger, 1971, p. 208). 
In the reduction of the lived world to a moment, both Heidegger and 
Rilke allude to the necessity for a silence that accompanies a loss of self. 
"Namelessly I have belonged to you from the beginning" writes Rilke. For 
both, the loss of self in order to be "found" in being, suggests religious 
overtones. Rilke writes, "Between the hammers our heart endures, like the 
tongue between the teeth, which yet continues to praise", while Heidegger 
discusses how in the beginning the Word was with God. These references, 
when combined with Rilke's pervasive theme of transformation to 
invisibility and Heidegger's persistence of the presence of being, provide for 
an interpretation of the saying as a search for the divine. 
Nietzsche writes, "without god ail things are possible". In Thus Snake 
Zarathustra. he writes, 
I love those who do not seek beyond the stars for a reason to perish 
and be sacrificed, but who sacrifice themselves to earth in order that 
earth may some day become superman's... 
It is time for man to mark his goal. It is time for man to plant the 
germ of his highest hope... (Nietzsche, p. 80). 
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For both Heidegger and Rilke it is the realization of the moment that 
provides the confirmation of Nietzsche's thought and the accompaning horror 
and liberation. Realization of moment reveals the dis-continuity of time 
formerly understood as linear and progressive. The seizure of the moment 
illustrates the potential for a radically subjective world. Silence, at the 
moment, can then be understood as the shock of realization as well as the 
'expression" of the ineffable. Transcending the appearance of the thing, 
coming into the clearing, man is called by the sounding of being. As 
man-thing (to being) he provides through his presence the reflective surface 
for the sounding and, as such, becomes the echo of the call from being. The 
ineffable does not reveal so much a loss of self as an infusion and diffusion 
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world" by being in which "we" are re-membered as objects of being: The 
response of silence understood as an echo of being is similar to Heidegger's 
"drawing into the draft of being". The silence of response becomes closely 
aligned with prayer or praise as silent expression of echo in response to the 
ineffable. 
Realization of the moment as dis-continous and ecstatic provides a 
highly precarious view of cosmology. "We are", writes Rilke, "the most 
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fleeting of all." To realize the moment is to acknowledge the absence of the 
presence of the gods and to face these "destitute times" which have grown, 
according to Heidegger, "so destitute it can no longer discern the default of 
God as a default" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 91). Consumed by technological 
production and forgetting the moment, we have abandoned a thinking that 
questions being. We have come to a time in which thinking is, as Novalis 
wrote, "the dream of a feeling long ago forgotten." 
Regaining the thinking of being requires first the realization and 
seizure of the moment in full force. Existential solitude must not only be 
re-cognized, it must be suffered. Refusal of suffering, of Heidegger's 
"venture", constitutes a refusal to ask the question of being and to enter the 
clearing. This suffering is not the virtuous suffering of pragmatism, to be 
endured as activity, rather it is existentially necessary to become one with 
being. Solitude can be seen as the unique and terrifying dimension of 
belonging. 
By following the Word, we follow the way as Heidegger's "traces of the 
gods." The Word, with God, suggests for both Heidegger and Rilke that in the 
here-ness of the clearing, in the ecstatic silence of the suspension of time and 
space, a transcendence of the Word results in the loss of self to One-ness, to 
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becoming one with being. Any naming, as a reference-to, refutes the totality 
of being suggesting the presence of an-other. Until the saying is understood 
as the transformation of earth to invisibility (i.e., nameless), there must 
always be a consideration of a reference-to and an expression of distinction. 
The silent response to the call requires even an additional element of 
existential danger. Heidegger writes that those who are "ventured are not 
abandoned." Those who listen for the call and who respond are ventured into 
the draft but in their venture they are not stranded. They are required, by 
the listening, to "live dangerously", however, man must make himself 
present, and, in so doing, risk Heidegger 's "cry". "The mere cry dies away 
and collapses" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 124). By keeping silent, by listening, we 
run the risk that being is not—that "I" am not. In short, we risk, by crying 
out into the darkness of earth, the possibility of no response. The risk of 
confirming solitude is to affirm isolation from being. Both Heidegger and 
Rilke are insistent that this crying out must be done. Listening for and 
thinking the question of being are confirmations that the inner-personal can 
be somehow matched with the outer-universal. 
The word "response" comes from re-spondere (to promise in return). 
The "saying of things" and the "question of being" are expressions of such 
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response—offered within the shelter of a promise. Even more, both argue 
that between being and self there can be a corn-promise in the sense of 
reciprocal understanding and being-with. Just as earth needs man to be, 
being must also need man. "But from what other source could the calling 
into thought come than from something that in itself needs thought, because 
the source of the calling wants to be thought about by its very nature?" 
Throughout this discussion, emphasis has been placed on poetic 
thinking rather than poetic thought. The difference rests between the 
process and the product of a specific mental activity. The culmination of 
poetic thinking is, of course, the poem. Culmination of thought, in the form 
of a poem, suggests also the culmination of a relationship between poet and 
his world. The conclusion of a poetic thought through the expression of the 
poem indicates that completion of a process by which the poet and his world 
have, as that moment, reached a sort of agreement. It is the negotiation 
stage prior to this agreement to which the discussion now turns. During this 
transitional period, the poet and his world become a vibrant and dynamic 
conversation in the sense used by George Quasha. 
The Latin discursus meant "conversation", a "running back and forth", 
rooted in the spoken dynamic of human exchange, and not what 
became as the lengthy argument of reasonable men, language devoid 
of listening to the other (Rothenberg and Rothenberg, p. 461). 
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The "running back and forth" between poet and world indicates the necessity 
for movement—"I", as poet, go "out" and travel "though" the world and 
return to "my" inner world. 
Through conversational movement, the poet en-gages, dis-engages, 
creates, and re-stores his world. This movement, for Mooney, the action of 
integrating, is essential for an understanding of the poetic inquiry and also 
for the redemption of man from these "destitute times". Mooney writes, 
It may be that in some cultural periods, end products can be the 
artists' chief mode of communication, but today, it is not true. The 
chief mode of communication now comes through taking art as a 
means of exploration to basic truths about processes (Mooney, "The 
Artist and Our Human Need", 1979, p.9). 
As a sweep of the world, Mooney's infinity sign suggests the flow of poetic 
engagement. The infinity sign, in the work of Mooney and for this 
discussion, expresses the relationship between man and his world as an 
integrative system through which man and world are engaged. It is 
important to stress the notion of engagement versus encounter. It is 
en-gagement, as a promise, through which the poet and world come into 
relation. The promise, as Heidegger's "care", and Rilke's "rescue", is the 
confirmation of life for both poet and world through creation. 
The point at the intersection of the infinity sign represents, first, the 
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point at which man enters into the world or the outer realm, the beginning 
of the exploration of outer world. At that moment, the intersection of the 
sign becomes the point of departure in which "I" travel out into the world, at 
which "my" body stays behind and my "me" is issued out as a kind of 
re-connaissance within the world that was without "me". It is at this 
juncture, this point of departure that man, as poet, realizes the intersection 
as a thresh-hold to world. Realization of the intersection as thresh-hold 
rather than as precipice, enables the poet to move from the "place" prior to 
the intersection, through the intersection, and into the "place" then "known" 
as world. Loco-motion, moving from one place to another place, receives its 
energy from emotions. Mooney emphasizes, however, that emotion is not 
the equivalent of our more mundane understanding. 
Being aware of self or of those operations by which relations are being 
formed in experience is something that comes via "feeling' —feeling 
taken in the sense of "feelers", "gropers", "sensers", not in the sense of 
emotions such as fear, hate, and anger. The understanding of this kind 
of feeling is something artists must have because, in their creating, it 
is feeling that guides and flows the forming (Mooney, "The Artist and 
Our Human Need", 1979, p. 11). 
E-motion is the moving-out, the act of apprehension in which the poet 
reaches for, grasps, and transforms the outer world. Similar to Mooney's 
"feeling" is Jacques Maritain s "connaturality" in which emotion is "an 
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emotion as form, which, being one with the creative intuition, gives form to 
the poem, and which is intentional..." (Maritain, 1953, p. 119). 
E-motion provides the impetus for the journey outward, away from 
the self, up to the intersection, and into a world. This "up to the intersection" 
does not imply the presence or location of the intersection as somehow "out 
there already", separating self from world and fixed in place. The 
intersection, the separation between self and world, represents the "twisting" 
of the world, by the poet, in which the place known as world is first posited 
so that the journey, or, flow, may continue. As a critical first step to a 
"homing of the world", the twist formulating the distinction "self and world", 
must be initiated by the poet. Twisting, through the perceptual e-moting of 
poetic thinking, provides meaning, or, Mooney suggests, "value" to life. He 
writes, 
. . .  a r t i s t s  c a n  h e l p  p e o p l e  r e n d e r  t h e i r  d a i l y  e x p e r i e n c e s  i n t o  v a l u e  
forms and value situations. What people want is help to help 
themselves in the process of creating significant values (Mooney, "The 
Artist and Our Human Need", 1979, p. 10). 
The twisting into a world, as the separation between self and world leads to 
a consideration of the process of the twisting itself as the action of poetic 
intentionality. The poet, in the attempt to "home" a world "out there", must 
manipulate or grasp the world through feeling and mold the things before 
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him. The molding of the things of the world into a home-place, into a place 
where man belongs is a driving force behind Martin Buber's notion of 
"figuration". "Man belongs in nature not merely with his vital acts, not 
merely as one who moves, but also as one who perceives" (Buber, 1965, p. 
158). Twisting the infinity sign into self and world, poetic intentionality is 
the impulse to transcend the appearances of the material world, to come to 
terms with where and who "I" am. "The artist", Professor Buber writes, "is 
the man who instead of objectifying what is over against him forms it into an 
image" (Buber, 1965, p. 160). The formation of an image, Buber's figuration, 
begins with the consideration of the sense world as a "stage". Observation 
and explanation, as scientific thinking, is supplanted by the vision and 
allusion of poetic thinking. 
As intentionality, the twisting produces an infinity sign from the 
single circle of the uni-verse, the one-voice. The initial twisting of the circle 
into self and world is not, however, the poet's act. That initial twist in which 
"I" separate from "world" is "my" own birth-the release from the womb. 
Womb, as the place of and for all, as the uni-verse in which all is, does not 
provide differentiation. Within the womb, "I" am with every-thing, and 
therefore, "I" am as everything, anonymous. The womb, as the place for all, 
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is Rilke's "first home" (in his Eighth Elegy). Human consciousness, the 
metaphor for the separation between man and other creatures of the earth, 
separates man as well from his "first home." 
With birth, with the "distancing" from the womb, man is "thrown" into 
his "second home" constructed by his own consciousness and dependent 
upon the split between "my", "1", and "world". Rilke s "tiny creatures", unlike 
man, "remain for ever in the womb that brought them forth! Joy of the gnat, 
that can still leap within, even on its wedding day: for womb is all!" Unlike 
the gnat who is able to leap "within", man, from birth must always "bridge" 
the self and world. 
Unable to look "out of" the world, Rilke's man is condemned to be 
"spectators always, everywhere." If man, as spectator, is always looking at 
rather than out of, it becomes the necessity of poetic thinking to re-turn, to 
travel through the world as "second home" in search of the call from "first 
home". It becomes necessary for the poet to become creator, to continue an 
exploration that, as T. S. Eliot wrote, "shall not cease until we know the place 
of our beginning for the first time." Knowing the place for the first time, the 
figurations of the world, is the integrative activity of Mooney, reached in the 
outer, "real" world. 
This is the bridge to reality, and the drive to establish that reality is 
great. The struggle is stong, and at times it may be desperate, but 
with patience and faith, the reality will come. The emergence will be 
in concreteness" (Mooney, "The Aratist and Our Human Need", 1979, p. 
15). 
As with Heidegger's "building", the poet in the sweep of the world constructs 
his "second home" in the image of that "first home" that cannot be regained. 
With the twist of birth into the "I" and the world, man is forever separated. 
Rilke, in the Eighth Elegy writes, 
Who's turned us round like this, so that we always, 
Do what we may, retain the attitude of someone who's departing? 
Just as he, on the last hill, that shows him all his valley for the last 
time, 
Will turn and stop and linger, we live our lives, for ever taking leave. 
Departing with the twist of birth, man "finds" himself "here" from 
"somewhere". The poet, with the twist of intentionality sets out to "home" 
the outer world through engagement with other things and with other 
people. Traveling out, going away from his first home of the womb, man 
leaves behind the permanent and, with the twist, forever finds himself in 
motion. Forever away from the all of the womb, man is "ventured" but not 
"abandoned". It is at this junction, the departing of the poet into the world 
that poetic loneliness may be most profound. Realizing at one time both the 
necessity to leave home (as the imperative for movement to initiate 
perception), and, the impossibility of returning home (to the first home), the 
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poet realizes loneliness as the fundamental human quality. 
J. Glenn Gray writes, "The advance of any civilization tends to cover up 
and obscure man's fundamental relations to his environment and to his 
fellows" (Gray, p. 96). What is obscured, what is challenged by the advance 
is the primordial loneliness of man between the womb and the world. Man 
is, in these times, Heidegger writes, "too late for the gods and too soon for 
being." The realization of this loneliness is, however, a necessity if the poet 
is to engage the world as "his" world. The realization of "my" loneliness, as a 
poet, is accompanied by "my" realization of man's loneliness. In determining 
his loneliness as fundamental, the poet does not turn inward to the exclusion 
of others. The poet turns inward to the commonality of all men within each 
man. In sensing his loneliness the poet confirms what is fundamental to 
man. Loneliness and the realization of this loneliness do not prescribe a 
return to an earlier historic time in which man was somehow "one" with 
world. Man, as man forced from the womb into the world is uniquely 
separate and distinct from Rilke's gnat within the womb of earth. 
Hellmuth Plessner writes, 
Even under the most primitive conditions man never had an 
absolutely self-contained environment like that of the animals; never 
did he possess the natural shelter of an environment attuned to his 
organs and drives (Cambell, p. 246). 
Rather than a sentimental return to a "romanticized" past, poetic thinking 
provides a mode through which "I" can discover "my" second home in the 
world—where "1" can "fit". Fitting with the world necessarily involves a 
fitting between the I and Thou. Realizing "my" loneliness as fundamental 
begins the process of poetic engagement with the world and with "my" 
others. We belong together through our individual and inevitable loneliness. 
E-moting into the world, the poet, at some point, turns, drawn inward 
to the direction of his first home. Although now an obsolete word, 
"en-moving" describes the process well. Moving out, e-moting into the 
world, the poet, at a point, exhausts himself. The movement out, understood 
as a familiarization of the world, requires the poet to select what provides 
him com-fort. Com-fort, in the sense of com (with) fortis (strength), is the 
poet s ability to match the surroundings—the people and things of his outer 
world—with the memories from his inner world. The exhaustion of 
e-motion, the exhalation of self into world, requires return, the inhalation of 
the inner world that is "my" past, what has come before "my" "now" of the 
outer world. 
With the return, the coming home toward the inner world, the poet 
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brings with him those "fittings" that have provided him a sense of comfort, 
of being-at-home, with their match with the poet's "past". The commonness 
of the outer world with "my" inner world provides the poet with the 
connection in which as Mooney writes,.. the commoness lies in neither 
pole (externality, intemality) but in the process by which we relate 
internality and externality in experience" (Mooney, "The Artist and Our 
Human Need", p. 11). Relation, the connection between the "out there" and 
the "in here", is the meaning-making of poetic thinking. It is, in fact, the 
source of poetic thinking to create a world, to seek out God in the world, and, 
in so doing, to emulate God. 
Understanding the infinity sign as a symbol of the poetic engagement 
between self and world, two "home regions" arise. On each far side, the point 
at which the poet returns to the inner home or the outer home, lies a zone 
through which the poet passes and "fits" himself. Mooney uses the symbols 
(+), (-), and (-), as denotations of the manner in which man fits with the 
world. These fittings, as adoption, rejection, or indifference, suggest a mood 
or tone which provides the poet a context in which transformation occurs. 
Understood as sym-pathy, anti-pathy, and em-pathy, the poet fits, or homes, 
his world to the degree in which he is able to match or engage one world 
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with the other. Within the flow, whether e-moting or en-moving, the poet, 
as em-pathetically, anti-pathetically, or sym-pathetically engaged with the 
world, seeks to match what he brings with him with what he "now" 
confronts. 
In the face-to-face with outer or inner world, the poet, in 
sym-pathetic relationship with world, is profoundly aware of his own sense 
of homing the first and second homes. Forming fittings that offer a poignant 
sense of being-at-home, the poet, in sym-pathetic engagement between 
outer and inner worlds, achieves a sense of consonnonance between what 
"was" and what is "now". The inner world, when understood as "my" past, 
offers memories of who "I" was prior to the "now" of "my" outer world. 
When "past'or prior to "my" inner world, the outer world provides the stuff 
for transformation, the material which "I" bring back to my semblance of a 
first home. As sou-venirs, [sou (up)-venir (coming)), "I" bring up those 
things and those others who assist in the construction of home. By bringing 
up, whether to "my" inner world the things and others of the outer world, or 
to "my" outer world the memories of the "past", the poet re-members his 
world, cements the past with present, and so consummates the future as 
potential. 
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In a sympathetic union of inner and outer world the poet gathers 
together, as belonging, what is common to both—his own subjectivity. 
Twisting the world, the poet creates his context for the realization of his own 
subjectivity. Through the coalescence, the weaving together of what is "out 
there" with what is "in here", the poet homes his world. 
In the twist, designating permanent and temporary (first and second 
homes), the poet engenders a multitude of differentiations predicated upon 
public and private worlds. In a sympathetic mode, the poet does not engage 
every event or item sympathetically. Rather, the sympathetic relationship 
indicates the poet s ease of exclusion and inclusion with who he is at that 
place. Sympathetically related between his first and second homes, the poet 
is at-home-in-the-world, comfortable with his own abilities of exclusion and 
inclusion as he further homes his world through deeper and more 
fundamental engagements with both worlds, Rilke writes, "I recognize 
everything here, and that is why it goes right into me, it is at home in me" 
(Schwarz, 1984, p. 29). 
Relative to the sympathetic mode, the antipathetic mode indicates a 
dis-engagement, a sense of "poor" fittings in the way in which they 
contribute to being-at-home. Failing to match the outer and inner world 
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with any degree of comfort, the poet is able to set the two at a distance but 
unable to come into satisfactory relation-with. Maritain writes, 
In a way similar to that in which divine creation presupposes the 
knowledge God has of His own essence, poetic creation presupposes, as 
a primary requirement, a grasping, by the poet, of his own 
subjectivity, in order to create (Maritain, 1953, p. 113). 
The anti-pathetic mode of being-in-the-world suggests a 
"mal-twisting" of the world in which the distinction between self and world 
is only partly the poet's making. The counter-twist of The Anyone 
diminshes the Poet's own discretion in the motion of the twist. From this 
perspective, it is possible to understand how the twisting of self and other, 
predicated on the common sense of the world and carried out by The 
Anyone, produces the contemporary estranged man. Disabled from his own 
discrimination between self and world, any subsequent discriminations 
founded on the public and private spheres are no longer his—neither the 
man nor the world bear any personal imprint. Disabled by his inability to 
differentiate himself and his world, man finds himself in a state of 
dis-ease—unable to be-at-home, unable to transform a world that has been 
prescribed as not his own. 
Carried one step further, where man's involvement with the twist is 
completely eliminated by the overwhelming Anyone, man finds himself 
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a-pathetically removed from the relationship of self and world. In fact, the 
relationship itself is eliminiated as the connection between self and world is 
severed, preventing the articulation of either element as an element of the 
conversation. With the articulation between self and world curtailed, man 
finds himself immobilized in a world, whether inner or outer, unable to 
con-verse with the world. E-motings and en-movings are no longer 
possible—he is frozen in the strangeness of a place he does not and cannot 
know. 
Lost within a world not of his making, he is no longer even "stranger" 
as this, too, requires relation-with. He is without relation, without family, he 
is utterly alone and without connection. Julian Jaynes writes, "How we 
excerpt other people largely determines the kind of world we live in. Writers 
and artists are doing in a controlled way what happens "in' consciousness 
more haphazardly" (Jaynes, p. 62). Being-in-the-world depends upon the 
cohesion of incidents, assembled as sequences, and then projected as future. 
With the loss of all relationships, man is crippled, unable for any movement 
to the "next" event or incident. Without familarity, without a home to leave 
or to return to, man finds himself in a stroboscopic world where all 
movements and therefore all perceptions become mechanized. "This is the 
97 
terrible tragedy of modern life", writes Clark Moustakas, 
. . .  t h e  a l i e n a t i o n  o f  m a n  f r o m  h i s  o w n  f e e l i n g s ,  t h e  d e s e n s i t i z a t i o n  o f  
man to his own suffering and grief, the fear of man to experience his 
own loneliness and pain and the loneliness and misery of others 
(Moustakas, p. 34). 
The a-pathetic twisting becomes so severe, so oppressive, that the 
bond between is constricted to the point of strangulation, of dis-integration. 
With this a-pathetic dis-integration, both world and man dissolve, 
suffocating from the dissolution of their relationship. As Plessner writes, 
".. .without any objectification whatever man is not merely primitive—he is 
no man at all" (Campbell, 234). Belonging together, both world and man 
perish in isolation. Rilke writes, "I would imagine to myself a lonely face 
that raised itself from pillows and sought, sought for some familiar thing, 
sought for something once seen, but there was nothing there" (Schwarz, p. 
32). It is the description of a death scene, in which the loss of familiarity 
signals the loss of relation. Unable to connect past with present through the 
re-cognition of things as familiar, the future is removed and man can only 
whimper and die within a stagnant present. 
Poetic thinking, as a formation and re-formation of world establishes 
man as the organic link to life itself. As the connector between moment and 
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moment, between "me" and "you", between self and world, the poet creates 
his own humanness and develops the humanness of life itself. In exploring 
the outer and inner worlds, in e-moting and en-moving, the poet, through 
poetic thinking, seeks creation as the integration of his first and second 
homes. In doing so, he is not a-bandoned but is banded together with other 
men who are also ventured. With the separation from the womb, man 
begins to seek ways to re-integrate and to re-member what has been 
initially dis-membered. Mooney writes, 
Religion, what is its basic function? The word, itself is cue, deriving 
from re (back) ligare (to bind together)... to form a union—a union of 
emergent knowing... a union with nature, a union with the universe 
(Mooney, "Creation, Continuity and Culture, 1979, p. 280). 
Union, the integration of poetic thinking involves man's re-searching for his 
first home, his attempt to return to the all in which no-thing lay outside the 
boundaries. In the attempt to come home, to re-turn to the One, man seeks 
to become un-born once more. 
By adding another infinity sign to represent the search of God for man, 
the re-searching deepens. The poet's continual re-search for the first home, 
the attempt to duplicate that home as the second home in the world, reveals 
man's re-turn to God. In exploring the world, as a response to the call from 
Being, man presupposes, among and between the things, God. Likewise, in 
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God's presence within the world, in His search and need for man, God 
presupposes the presence of man. The things stand between God and man. 
Earth stands over and against God and man such that earth becomes the 
medium for the dialogue between the divine and the mortal. The reciprocal 
need of one for the other creates the relation through which earth serves as 
the conduit for divine as well as mortal intervention. Shelley writes, "Poetry 
redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in man." 
In poetic thinking, man engages the world to provide for an 
engagement with God. Poetic thinking summons the "promise"—as the 
com-promise of reality, as the en-gagement with world, as the re-sponse to 
the call. The most profound of these pledges, however, is the promise of 
faith, the promise of the presence of God and man as the belonging together, 
as the integration of life. This relationship, divine and mortal, promises the 
universal, which pledges the life span of mankind through the recognition 
and realization of the God within man and the man within God. As the poet 
explores his world and so dis-covers God, God's presence is realized. Rabbi 
Heschel writes, 
Man is more than what he is to himself. In his reason he may be 
limited, in his will he may be wicked, yet he stands in a relation to 
God which he may betray but not sever and which constitutes the 
essential meaning of his life. He is the knot in which heaven and earth 
100 
are interlaced (Heschel, 1959, p. 134). 
Rilke, in his Ninth Elegy, writes, "Earth, is it not your dream to be one 
day invisible? Earth! Invisible! What is your urgent command, if not 
transformation?" The invisibility of earth occurs, in poetic thinking, as the 
mirroring of the outer world, the second home, with the inner first home. 
The poet "homes" his second home in alignment with his first home. As he 
comes closer to where "every word is at home", the alignment is more nearly 
perfected until, "if only once", he dis-covers the Logos the early Greeks 
intended—the provision of form to matter. 
It is the moment when, as George Quasha suggests, "language is true 
to itself", and man no longer feels himself to be master of language. It is the 
moment in which "my" inner self and "my" outer world align with one 
another. "I" come to know what is "real" through the alignment of the earth, 
now invisible, as it is en-woven with "my" subjectivity. Poetic thinking 
constructs a tapestry of self and world. 
The invisibility of earth comes about as earth is re-cognized by the 
poet as one element of the Four Fold of earth, sky, God, and man. No longer 
"knowable" as merely a particular, earth is now realized as co-dependent 
with sky and belonging within the Four Fold. In saying the things "in ways 
they never dreamed", poetic thinking gathers together those elements which 
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belong, and, in their belonging, are together. Rilke writes, ".. .those things 
that are so closely akin to us, have by daily parrying been so crowded out of 
life that the senses with which we could have grasped them are atrophied. 
To say nothing of God" (Mood, p. 98). 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EVOLUTION OF POETIC THOUGHT IN PRAGMATIC CULTURE 
"Vision is figurating faithfulness to the unknown and does its work in 
co-operation with it. It is faithfulness not to the appearance, but to 
being—to the inaccessible with which we associate." Martin Buber 
For contemporary pragmatic America, vision, as a metaphor for 
being-at-home-in-the-world, offers a way to understand the current sense 
of dis-integration. When the world is cast by the vision of pragmatism, in 
the light of scientific thought, the shadow worlds are dissolved. The worlds 
of mystery, the worlds of the knowable are either physically removed 
through the conquest of the frontier, or dismissed, through the creation and 
re-formulation of non-sense. By casting the world "out there" as wilderness, 
the home becomes shelter not for physical man, but rather for the fears and 
the accumulation of these fears of man. Venturing out into the world 
becomes an adventure of necessity and the basis for survival. Survival, 
based on the encounter and conquest of the environment, becomes a tragic 
expression of the loss of balance between man and his world. Nishitani 
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writes, 
.. when the relationship between man and an insensitive world on the 
one hand, and between this same world and God on the other, are 
made the ground of religion, what becomes of the relationship 
between God and man which is religion? (Nishitani, p.49) 
In a society where man and world represent a competitive system, 
loneliness is not only a signal of individual failure but a threat to the society 
itself. The individual, alone against the world, bands together with other 
individuals in an effort of resistance to the world "out there" and loneliness 
is then associated with weakness, with "dis-empowerment." With the 
banding together of individuals in opposition to the environment, power 
itself becomes a mode of encounter with the world, the cohesion between 
men in their mutual opposition to earth. The initial need to "home the 
world" by clearing the land has become the impetus for man s destruction of 
his own foundation. 
The initial balance between man and frontier, predicated on his own 
inabilities for conquest, has been offset with the development of technology 
to the place that man has depleted the earth, removing the very stuff 
through which he evolves into man. The endless quest for change, for 
development, has resulted in a view of transformation that is only completed 
through material appropriation. Rilke's transformation of earth, the poetic 
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impulse to see transformation as a dialectical process, is alien to the 
pragmatic notion of transformation through material quantitative reduction. 
In order to "civilize" the frontier, American pragmatism insists on reduction 
of the elements, of a kind of physical distillation. Alchemy, for more 
"primitive" societies, is a process, a contemplative union with world. 
Product, for such a culture is merely by-product to process. But, in the 
pragmatic position, alchemy, is a means to an end which is product. Without 
great effort we are unable to consider gold, as did Rilke, longing to "go 
home", to return to earth. 
By looking at balance as an expression of scientific thinking and as an 
expression of poetic thinking, "homing the world" can be understood from 
dramatically different perspectives. Scientific thought, with its emphasis on 
explanation, seeks meaning through fixed connections between the things of 
the world. As such, meaning, as constellations within the world, is 
cumulative and the language of science finite. Through explanation, balance, 
for the scientific world, is achieved and, perhaps more important, 
maintained. Contemporary man, when operating primarily with the 
language of science, sets the world on a fulcrum in which the dynamics of 
balance as process are continually removed. Balance, in the contemporary 
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scientific world, requires a relationship between man and earth which is 
fixed upon man's dominion over rather than conservation of the resources at 
hand. 
The contemporary interpretation of resource indicates the 
pervasiveness of a balance based on the expendability of the stuff of the 
earth. Rather than offering a concept of new beginnings, of re-newal, 
resource, for scientific thinking is the source upon which depletion has been 
at least an implicit goal. The depletion and reduction of resources represents 
a successful "homing" of a frontier world. The venture out, the exploration of 
the world as wilderness, resources as fuel, becomes a venture for 
appropriation and acquisition. Resources, for scientific thinking, fuel 
contemporary man's destruction of his own potential for a "home-land". 
A poetic interpretation of resource, however, envisions resource as 
dynamic process, a verb. "I", the poet, re-source my-self through "my" flow 
into the world. "I" come home and again and again re-source my-self into 
the world with each e-motion and en-motion. In re-sourcing, the poet 
re-cognizes the world as his place of origin and, with this re-cognition, the 
poet re-cognizes depletion of the earth as organically connected with his own 
exhaustion. In the poetic balance of re-sourcing, both men and earth seek 
106 
renewal. 
In the balance of poetic thinking, world becomes the fulcrum, the 
hinge of the between of man and God. In the e-motions and en-movings, the 
poet reconciles self and world through the realization of difference between 
the two. In doing so, poetic man, in his fundamental loneliness between the 
inner and outer worlds realizes himself as the difference. The difference of 
who he is when "out there" as public self and who he is when in the inner 
world as private self is the expression of a necessity for poetic 
thinking—doubt. It is doubt, for the poet, that enables his thinking and 
provides the impetus for movement within the world. It is through doubt 
that the poet affirms his own sense of the ineffable. A "sense" of the 
ineffable, of the Kantian noumenal world, is fundamental to a poetic 
transformation of the things of the world. Through the phenomenal world, 
the poet finds the material for transformation. However, it is the suggestion 
of something more, of something profound as the noumenal world, which 
serves as the source for the allusion of language and the transformation of 
the things. 
Doubt, while fundamental to poetic thinking, is antithetical to the 
contemporary epistemology founded on explanation. In scientific thinking, 
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doubt is an obstacle preventing explanation. So long as doubt remains, 
scientific thought remains inconclusive, and, as such, non-cumulative. Lack 
of closure, in scientific thought, is a result of flawed or inadequate thought, 
while, for poetic thinking, lack of closure serves for further allusion, 
dis-covery, and ultimately, creation. 
Contemporary pragmatism, through the assertion that "matter 
matters", has found it necessary to suppress doubt, and, with its suppression, 
it has become necessary to relocate the noumenal world. If scientific 
exploration is to explain, is to "level off", by "clearing the land", the 
presence of God provides an unnecessary and potentially incapacitating 
obstacle. It is necessary to divest the wilderness of God, to consider the 
wilderness not only as God-less, but, in fact, as pagan and in need of the 
implementation of God. The wilderness is not a place for God, and further, it 
must be cultivated or civilized to make a place. "Cultivation", in 
contemporary pragmatism, becomes a means both for de-spoiling the earth 
as well as the legitimation of these actions by casting the "cultivator" as 
missionary. By providing the role of cultivator, the wilderness and the 
cultivator are both rendered inadequate without the forceful intrusion of 
man into the environment. Ultimately, the further the intrusion into the 
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phenomenal world, so the concept develops, the closer to "making a place" to 
which God can then come home to the world. 
The assumption of making a home in the world for God's return serves 
as the fuel for an increased diminishment of wilderness. The "development" 
of the earth, as a response to "taming" the frontier, provides clear license to 
the resources, as raw material. Any concept of pantheism or naturalism 
must be eliminated. In its place, one God, somewhere further "out there", in 
fact, super-natural, is essential to man's domination of the earth. 
By casting the phenomenal world as "all there is", as dis-associated 
from the noumenal world, contemporary pragmatic American society has 
"secularized" the everyday. Denying any inter-connections between the 
physical and spiritual worlds, setting Heaven "out there", has provided 
access to the earth without fear of consequence. However, in isolating 
doubt, scientific thought has constructed a paradox. Unable to accept the 
Kantian position of the unknowable, scientific thinking instead postulates 
"unknowing". 
What is not known, in scientific thinking, can be known through 
diligence and pursuit. It is pursuit and its application which has lead 
philosophically to the exhaustion of the earth and the consequent exhaustion 
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of modern man. Working harder and harder, stripping away more and more 
of the phenomenal world, modern man has become unable to accept Gregory 
Batesons suggestion: 
Our imperfect understanding should not be allowed to feed our 
anxiety and so increase the need to control. Our studies could be 
inspired by a more ancient, but today less honored, motive: a 
curiosity about the world of which we are part. The rewards of such 
work are not power but beauty (Bateson, p. 269). 
Having, dismissed the spiritual from the material world, modern man reaches 
the final layers of the phenomenal world and finds his pursuit has resulted 
in what Buber refers to as an ordered world rather than the world order. 
In ordering the world through explanation, rather than dis-covering 
the world order through allusion, contemporary man fails to re-cognize his 
relationship with the world as a being among beings. Unable to "let things 
lay before him and take them to heart", unable to follow the Buberian 
notions of distance and relation, scientific thought finds in the phenomenal 
world only layers to be stripped away. For scientific thinking the world can 
be re-finished by melting away each layer until only the original surface 
remains. 
For poetic thinking, rather than a melting away, the approach is 
closely associated with the artistic concept of pentimento. In the process of 
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pentimento a "new" painting emerges when a previous painting begins to 
reveal itself from underneath the "current'' surface. As the various paints 
chemically react to one another, some layers begin to emerge, while others 
gradually recede. Pentimento provides a metaphor for understanding poetic 
thinking as the "letting things be", in their phenomenal state, so that their 
noumenal state can emerge in the "taking them to heart". The constant and 
dynamic e-mergings and re-cessings provide a picture of reality that is 
constantly in flux, constantly in-constant. 
It is important to emphasize the character of pentimento not only for 
its qualities of emergence and recession but to note also the constructive 
layering involved in this process. Pentimento offers a perspective for poetic 
thinking both in its meaning-making through dis-covery as well as its 
meaning-making through the initial layering of one reality strata upon 
another. Empirical reality, when considered poetically, is subjected to 
radical doubt, and in this subjectification is made malleable and personally 
rendered. Reality, when subjected to poetic inquiry, becomes dynamic and 
realized as potential rather than as object. Rilke writes, "Is it possible that 
despite discoveries and progress, despite culture, religion and world-wisdom, 
one has remained on the surface of life?" (Schwarz, p. 14) For the poet, a 
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refusal to doubt, a refusal to question "my" understanding and "fit" with the 
"one objective world", constitutes a refusal to integrate "me" with world. In 
the failure of integration, both "my" existence and the world, for me, are 
jeopardized. 
For the poet, the particular is of extreme importance. In the isolation 
of the particular, the poet sets an object at a distance so that, through poetic 
transformation, poet and object can become as one. Rilke writes, "He was a 
poet and hated the approximate" (Schwarz, p. 100). In isolating the 
particular the poet celebrates more than the isolation of the object and his 
own subjectively constructed sample of reality. In the isolation he also sets 
in motion a process by which constellations of meaning are constructed and 
adapted. By considering meaning-making as the connections of isolated and 
personalized objects within the world, the poet is dependent upon diversity. 
Diversity, for the poet, is both the manner in which he dis-covers the 
world as well as the manner in which he constructs the world through 
linguistic allusion. "Playing with the world", the poet doubts his own reality, 
his past, and his potential as future. In doing so, he is dependent upon 
Bateson's stochastic system of world in which randomization becomes an 
essential element of world. Rather than the cumulative, ordered world of 
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scientific thinking, the world which emerges from poetic thinking is 
constantly yet inconsistently changing. By viewing the world in this manner, 
the poet engages a world in the Heraclitean sense of being present at what 
happens to him. As a result, Dilthey writes, 
. . .  the continuity between what  we remember and the present ,  the 
continued existence of a qualitatively determined reality, and the 
continued effectiveness of the past as a power in the present, give to 
what is remembered a peculiar characteristic of being present' 
(Dilthey, p. 71). 
By being present at what happens to him, by first engaging a world 
through the epoche and then through poesis, the poet synthesizes his time 
and makes himself at home with world. In the synthesis of past, present, 
and future, the poet "samples out" an event which, for Dilthey,.. becomes 
a symbol, not for a particular idea but for a complex seen in life" (Dilthey, 
p. 38). Through dynamic engagement as balance with the world, the poet's 
ability for re-memberence is enabled. In re-cognizing the importance of the 
past as the meaning-giving category of life, Dilthey indicates the significance 
of the past as foundation, as reference point for subsequent experiences. In 
contrast to scientific thinking based upon a constant push towards future, 
towards a development based upon goal and completion, poetic thinking, in 
seeking out the particular, dwells in the world and assumes a contemplative 
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attitude towards the things of the world. 
Dilthey writes, "We call an attitude contemplative, esthetic, and 
artistic, when the subject finds rest, as it were, from the labor of 
scientifically investigating nature." (Dilthey, p. 69) It is important to note 
Dilthey's mention of "rest", for it is the contemplative attitude of poetic 
thinking, as the synthesis of past, present, and future, that enables the poet 
to be present. Being present, the poet realizes himself as "here" relative to 
the flux of time. In his here-ness, he realizes a degree of rest through an 
ecstatic pause. 
The importance of past for poetic thinking also includes the co-related 
notions of respect and reverence for the world. By first re-specting (looking 
back) on his world and then re-vering (holding in awe) his world, the poet 
lets the things be and takes them to heart. In re-specting his world, the poet 
considers the past as his past. In re-vering, the poet re-cognizes similarities 
between his-story and the story of the world, between the personal and the 
universal. It is the attitude which Dilthey describes as "universal sympathy" 
in which the "dissonances of life dissolve in a universal harmony of all 
things" (Dilthey, p. 69). Through the epoche "I" and the object "meet", in 
isolation, and through the union of poesis, "I" and the object become 
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relationally meaningful. As such, "I", as poet, re-cognize my-self as a being 
among beings. 
Respect and reverence suggest, for the poet, a co-relative expression 
of the public and the private. "My" respect is displayed to the world, is 
exhibited to those others within my surrounding world. Reverence, on the 
other hand, is "my" understanding of how "I" feel. The union of thinking and 
feeling allows the poet to engage his world, to accept a universe comprised 
both of phenomenal and noumenal characteristics. It is the relationship of 
thinking and feeling which provides for "universal sympathy." 
In contrast to the poetic unity of thinking and feeling, scientific 
thought suggests feeling as somehow less significant, obviously 
non-empirically verifiable. The failure to understand thinking and feeling as 
co-related modes of being results in the scientific concept of knowledge as 
distinguished from a poetic sense of wisdom. The scientific world-view, by 
positing a world which ultimately can be known, suggests an order to be 
revealed. With cause and effect, scientific thought understands the world as 
"knowable". The world order, conceptually constructed through cause and 
effect, can be manipulated and re-ordered. By re-ordering the order of the 
world, scientific thinking realizes control. Failure to know the order is a 
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failure to have thought adequately, never a failure to have felt sufficiently. 
In eliminating the significance of feeling as an element of thinking, a 
scientific world-view negates the existence of any noumenal characteristics 
within a world by virture of the failure of appearance. 
Perhaps as important to the negation is the failure of scientific 
thinking to posit any boundaries for knowledge. Poetic thinking, by 
acknowledging the noumenal world through allusion, establishes a boundary 
between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds in which language is the 
bridge. As a connector between these worlds, poetic language recognizes the 
boundary between the two not as obstacle but as parameter. As Heidegger 
writes, 
A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks 
recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its 
presenting (Heidegger, 1971, p. 154). 
Language, as poetic allusion, provides the presencing of the noumenal 
world by recognizing the boundary of knowledge as the barrier of the 
ineffable. In seeking the noumenal world, through allusion, the poet 
transforms the things of the world through a re-naming of the things. In 
this way, fantasy, as the presentation of the noumenal world becomes 
significant for poetic thinking. By creating or re-presenting the things of the 
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world through linguistic allusion, the poet connects the things "out there" 
with the inner world of self. In so doing, the poet harmonizes his inner 
world with an outer world and brings a quality of alignment to both worlds 
now seen as universe. 
In contrast to this, scientific-technological thinking, with its rejection 
of allusion and fantasy, provides a world "out there" and "me" as necessarily 
distinct. Rather than a poetic wisdom with the world, scientific-technological 
knowledge "has" the world and "uses" the world for the generation of "new" 
knowledge. As the self and world are distinguished, scientific knowledge 
deposes the need for belief, concentrating instead upon the repression of 
belief through the accumulation of knowledge. 
Scientific-technological thinking further precludes the acceptance of 
feelings as the result of its perspective on the need for control of the 
external environment. Accepting the natural world as in need of control and 
an implementation of order, the scientific perspective suggests a similar 
approach to the inner world as well. Belief, then, as empirically unverifiable, 
becomes inadequate. In controlling the inner world, like the outer world, 
e-motions are necessarily truncated. Removing the emotions as a viable way 
of knowing precludes not only the reaction to an isolated event but also the 
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e-moting in which further exploration is enabled. By de-meaning the 
emotions, the world, as material for future meaning-making is consequently 
de-meaned. The alienation of self from personal emotions is one and the 
same with the alienation of self from world. Deprived of emotions and 
e-moting, man lives within an inner world dramatically insulated from the 
world "out there". The an-aesthetic world turns in upon itself leaving "me" 
out side the out there. 
Peter Berger, in The Sacred Canopy writes... it is important to recall 
that the relationship between human activity and the world produced by it 
is and remains dialectical, even when this fact is denied, consciousness" 
(Berger, p. 96). 
The recognition of a mis-alignment between "my" inner world, or, who 
"I" am, with the outer world, or, who "I" am out there, remains just that, a 
recognition. "I" perceive myself as alienated, a stranger to the world of my 
own construction. Alienation, for Berger, 
. . .  is  the process whereby the dialect ical  relat ionship between the 
individual and his world is lost to consciousness. The individual 
forgets' that this world was and continues to be co-produced by him. 
Alienated consciousness is undialectical consciousness (Berger, p. 85) 
Berger suggests, in keeping with the notion of poetic thinking, that 
man without his own recognition of the world as his meaning is estranged 
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not only from that world "out there" but estranged from himself as well. 
Where Berger differs from the concepts of poetic thinking is in his notion 
that religion somehow is a significant cause of alienation, and, in fact, the 
cause is largely predicated upon poetic thinking. Berger writes, 
Religion posits the presence in reality of beings and forces that are 
alien to the human world. Be that as it may, the assertion, in all its 
forms, is not amenable to empirical inquiry. What is so amenable, 
though, is the very strong tendency of religion to alienate the human 
world in the process (Berger, p. 89). 
The human world, for Berger, as the world of socially constructed 
reality, is removed from the influence of human intervention by calling upon 
"alien beings" with greater power and abilities. Berger takes the position 
that religion, in positing the existence of an empirically unverifiable 
noumenal world, removes man from his necessary role as world-constructor. 
By handing over the keys of the kingdom to God, man fails to assume the 
responsibility for his own primary role in meaning-making. Man therefore 
becomes impotent. 
Poetic thought does not suggest a separate reality to which man has no 
access. The noumenal characteristics of the world are not inherently covert. 
God, for the poet, is concealed by the abuse or mis-use of language in which 
everyday experiences are lost in the banality of the everyday. Poetic 
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thinking emphasizes belief and seeks, through the everyday, to join man and 
God through the common experience of nature. The Heideggerian concept of 
the everyday, the insistence upon letting things be, his call for the 
unification of the Four Fold, all point to poetic thought as contemplation in 
which God and all of nature conjoin. 
Belief in a noumenal world, however, does not result in a sort of 
human automaton. On the contrary, belief requires that "I" act in a way 
which significantly differs from what "I" understand. For me to believe, "I" 
must first become aware of my own lack of understanding. In the Kantian 
phenomenal-noumenal world-view, to believe, "I" must first come to the 
boundary of the phenomenal in which "I" can know no more. "Knowing no 
more" can only suggest that "1" know, in some way, that there is more to be 
known, and that "I" currently do not know it. Belief depends on "my" 
understanding of "my" lack of understanding and acting or thinking in a 
manner consonnant with the ineffable qualities of which "I" do not know. 
Berger's argument that the initial stage in which "1" understand my lack of 
understanding represents "false consciousness" is quite accurate. Berger 
writes, 
Whatever may be the ultimate merits of religious explanations of the 
universe at large, their empirical tendency has been to falsify man's 
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consciousness of that part of the universe shaped by his own activity, 
namely, the socio-cultural world (Berger, p. 90). 
False consciousness for poetic thinking equates with the notion that 
the everyday is irrevocably separate from the noumenal, that the 
phenomenal has no "real" connection with the noumenal. By providing a 
perspective in which man's consciousness not only produces the everyday 
world but also participates in the connection between phenomenal and 
noumenal, poetic thinking rescues thinking from the secular and re-invites 
the sacred. Poetic thinking is not oppositional to reason. Poetic thinking 
opposes the failure to see within reason the non-reasonable, what John Cage 
calls the willingness to see that chaos and order are not opposed, and, to 
effect the balance between phenomenal and noumenal as the dynamic 
exploration of world. Alienation is not so much the result of a failure to 
account for human construction of social reality as it is a failure to account 
for human activity as meaningful and sacred. 
Poetic thought, through belief, considers identity as a match between 
the "me", "I" know as "me", or, the private "I", and, the "me" as "I" know "I" 
am known by others, or, the public "I". The multiple "I" necessary for the 
apprehension of belief, the necessity that "I" act in a manner "I" also 
understand to be dissonant with "my" understanding, establishes the 
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possibility for the articulation of a public and private "I". Novalis writes, 
The inner world is as it were more than the outer. It is so intimate,so 
home-like—one would like to live completely in it—it is so familiar 
and native. It is a pity that it is so dreamlike, so uncertain. Must then 
of all things the best, the truest appear so apparent—and the 
apparent so true? What is outside me is precisely in me and vice 
versa (Baron, p. 195). 
Novalis' consideration of poetic transformation of reality, like Rilke's, 
reflects the radical doubt of poetry in relation to empirical reality coupled 
with radical belief in the potential for realization of the noumenal world. 
Whether with Novalis—"the stars would rise in him", or, with Rilke—"the 
birds pass through me", the poetic identity emphasizes not only the belief 
but the necessity for a synthesis of beings by which nature and man are 
harmonized. 
In addition to connecting the inner and outer worlds through the 
poetic consideration of a spiritual world, poetic thought constructs a sense of 
being-at-home by providing place for both my absence and my presence. As 
the un-conditional "place" for "my" belonging, "I" am enabled to leave home 
and come to home throughout the poetic search of the world. By 
being-at-home, whether as the public "I" or as the private "I", the search 
confirms the alignment of inner and outer worlds with the positioning of 
"my" poetic identity. 
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Dilthey writes, "Poetry does not attempt to know reality as science 
does, but it aims to reveal what general significance an event has, or men 
and objects assume, in the vast network of life relationships" (Dilthey, p. 37). 
It is this "vast network of life relationships" that poetic thinking anticipates 
and nourishes through its affirmations of respect and reverence. Looking 
back, "always taking leave" as Rilke writes, the poet re-searches his past 
against the background of mankind's past, re-sources himself as a being 
among other beings in the world, and re-veres what is most poignant and 
most profound, the ineffable quality of being-at-home in the world. 
As homeward bound beings, poets harmonize the universal and 
personal with the common needs of man—to belong, to love and to hate, to 
overcome, and, ultimately, to survive. As homeward bound, poets re-cognize 
the earth as their source and re-source, as their empirical reality and their 
inner reality, as the commodity for their enterprise of life. Bound by home, 
the poet is irrevocably promised to the earth and the earth to him in poetic 
encounter. As the things "become more than they had ever dreamed" and 
man begins a dialogue with God, the earth is re-sourced as sacred place for 
meeting. The eschatological impulse is eipressed by "homeward bound" as a 
journey to the super-natural world following death. Homeward bound, for 
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the poet, commands his attention, through linguistic allusion, to the earth as 
source for the promise of engagement through belief. In doubting the world, 
in suspending the empirical reality of history and material sciences, the poet 
transforms the world. In aligning the inner and outer worlds with public 
and private domains and providing a sense of co-respondence, the poet 
brings home to the world as he brings himself into the world and the world 
into himself. In the co-respondence, both the inner and the outer worlds 
provide echoes to one another, and, in doing so realize an alignment similar 
to Heidegger 's notion of "dwelling." 
Dwelling, as "the basic character of human being", is the primal mode 
in which man is man on earth. As a dweller, man, through cultivation and 
construction, carries out the poetic notions of respect and reverence. 
Heidegger remarks that the Greek work "techne" meant "to bring forth or to 
produce". Technology, in contemporary society, fails to account for dwelling 
as man's fundamental character of human being. Contemporary technology, 
even so called "appropriate technology", fails to adequately re-member 
dwelling as a pre-requisite for being human. "Only if we are capable of 
dwelling", writes Heidegger, "only then can we build." (Heidegger, 1971, 
p. 160) Building as constructing on the earth rather than with the earth fails 
124 
to re-call the promise of engagement. By the failure to re-call, man 
separates from earth and is left without home. 
The Greek sense of "techne", indicating a "bringing forth", is parallel to 
our sense of fantasy. The fantastic process of poetic thinking—through 
which earth and earth things are transformed, through which "my" public 
and "my" private self are identified and aligned, through which inner and 
outer worlds are harmonized, requires that man dwell poetically. Heidegger 
writes, "Poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape 
it and hover over it. Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making 
him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling" (Heidegger, 1971, 
p. 218). 
In America today the separateness of inner and outer worlds, of "my" 
life to the lives around me, of even me to me, leads to a desolation of the 
earth. All around are the maneuverings and manipulations of man who, in 
the fear of loneliness and the antagonism towards earth and earth things, 
finds himself the desolator. In the dismissal of spiritual reality an American 
consciousness has so ravaged the surroundings that to "fit" with the world is 
in itself an aberration. It is not false consciousness to balance the material 
and the spiritual, to find within and among the things of the world another 
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world of noumenal dimensions. It is not religion but a dismissal of religion 
that has resulted in an American consciousness willing to steal the sacred 
from the earth. In settling the country, Americans, too, settled in. Home, as 
a shelter from wilderness was "fixed". No longer a wanderer, no longer 
nomadic, contemporary man no longer takes home with him, no longer sees 
and hears gods all around him. 
In American poetry and thinking, however, are the traces of thinking 
and feeling that equate Heidegger's "dwelling" with a "homing of the world". 
Mooney's poetry and prose especially appeal to a sense of home in which 
man and earth can be at home with one another, in which man and earth are 
co-respondents. Poetic thought, with its respect and reverence, as in Buber's 
distance and relations, redirects the American sense of cultivation. Walt 
Whitman writes, 
The main shapes arise! 
Shapes of Democracy total, results of centuries, 
Shapes ever projecting shapes, 
Shapes of turbulent manly cities, 
Shapes of the friends and home-givers of the whole earth, 
Shapes bracing the earth and braced with the whole earth. 
Whitman s vision of a robust American cultivating spirit re-sounds in 
Mooney's "Relocating God and Man and Nature". 
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Man can recognize 
universe and God, 
nature and man, 
his genesis, 
his now-abiding place 
for going on, 
his means and end, 
affording him such meaning, 
harmony of joining in, 
and happiness, 
as he, in consciousness, 
can, himself, attain. 
Through poetic thinking the current estrangement of man and world, 
the current homeless-ness of contemporary man can be rescued. 
Re-specting, American thinking can witness the development of its own 
erring as it chose a course counter to its own source in nature. Re-vering, 
American thinking can come into relation with the earth and its inhabitants, 
honoring the call of being as the promise of life. 
Breath 
There is a remote echo of a whisper 
Still 
On the lips of the earth... 
No longer heard 
But faintly felt 
In a resistance that seeks 
Rather than contains. 
But, in our dis-member ment so complete 
(we attack without fear of reprisal) 
We dissect the atom 
And so turn the world upon itself. 
Once I think we knew... 
But now, unable to be-held . 
And listen... 
The whisper could re-member us. 
We could be drawn through the inhalation 
To the lingering nearness 
But in the looking 
We plot points to stretch them apart. 
We form lines 
We extend space 
Until in-side-out, 
We turn 
Towards any light from someplace else ... 
Unable to recognize a note from home ... 
Still believing the stars are following us. 
John Mann 
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CHAPTER V 
EPILOGUE 
We live in times marked by desperate searchings-for. Poetic thinking 
offers the search as hope for comfort, through engagement with the world. 
It is necessary to remember, though, when speaking of poetic thinking, that 
history harbors memories where poetic thinkers consorted with evil. Too 
often, "poets" invoke Culture as a way to prevent progress towards a more 
just and a more humane world. Too often, poems and poets have 
contributed to campaigns and campaign-constructors seeking to bring others 
to their knees. It is necessary to remember that Martin Heidegger supported 
Hitler s Nazi regime as a member of the Nationalist Socialist Party. Behind 
the poetic words of Heidegger are always these words ... 
Doctrine and "ideas" shall no longer govern your existence. The 
"Fuhrer" himself, and only he, is the current and future reality of 
Germany, and his word is your law. Learn to know ever more deeply 
within you: "From now on every matter demands determination and 
every action demands responsibility. 
Heil Hitler! 
Martin Heidegger (Runes, p. 28) 
In those moments when poetic thinking assumes the absolute, when 
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God is found, and, through a poet-oracle, commands; man loses sight of the 
necessity for diversity. Diversity, for poetic thinking as well as for the world 
at large, acts as a release valve against the Answer. In naming the Absolute 
and offering the Answer, man attends to desperation and foregoes the 
search. In the foregoing, man allows desperation to overshadow the vision 
of the search. 
Despair offsets the balance found in man s loneliness with the world. 
In despair poetic thinking forsakes diversity and submits to technology. 
Nowhere is the successful pervasion of technology more apparent than in the 
de-meaning of the search and the searchers. Collected and categorizing, 
seeking only the uniform, man announces God and maligns the ineffable. 
The claim of ineffability in contemporary society too often disguises man s 
attempts for gain and control. 
It is also necessary to re-member, though, that ineff ability may 
suggest man's faith in life itself. An abuse of faith indicts only the abusor. 
Losing sight of faith, man betrays the ineffable. In the betrayal man and 
God suffer. 
Today, in man's efforts to distance himself from suffering, the betrayal 
flourishes. Without the risk of suffering man fails to amplify the pain 
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around him and an an-aesthetic world persists amidst starvation, war, 
poverty, and disease. Technology reveals its disdain for life as it desperately 
prolongs death. The cables and hoses of life-support systems are fed by 
fear, not by joy. 
The Homeless ... the Poor ... the Abused ... are only categories for 
discussion. Matching grants and long-distance call-ins only distance the 
particulars within the categories. The elderly woman alone, wandering a late 
night city street... the middle-aged man, alone at home, without a job, 
without hope ... the bruised and swollen face of a child alone in the 
emergency room ... the particulars must be suffered for the victims they 
are. 
In sensing the suffering of the world, poetic thinking gives voice to 
man's own inhumanity. It is courage that rebukes the idolatry of the 
Answer. In man's inhumanity lies the power for his own rescue. 
131  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bachelard, G. The Poetics of Space. (1969) Boston: Beacon Press. 
Baron, F., Dick, E.S., Maurer, W. R. Rilke: The Alchemy of Alienation. (Ed.). 
(1980). Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas. 
Belth, M. The Process of Thinking 
Bateson, G. Mind and Nature. (1979) New York: Bantam Books. 
Berger, P.L. The Sacred Canopy. (1967) New York: Anchor Books. 
Brodersen, A. (Ed.). (1976) Collected Paper of Alfred Schutz. The Hague, 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Buber, M. A Believing Humanism: Mv Testament. 1902-196'v (1967). New 
York: Simon and Schuster. 
Buber. M. Between Man and Man. (1965). New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company. 
Buber, M. I and Thou. (Trans.). Walter Kaufman. (1970) New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons. 
Buber, M. The Knowledge of Man: Selected Essavs. (Ed.). Maurice Friedman. 
(1965) New York: Harper and Row, Publishers. 
Campbell, J. (Ed.). (1973). Man and Time. Papers from the Eranos 
Yearbooks. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought. (Trans.) J. Haden. (1981) New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981. 
Disch, R. (Ed.) The Ecological Conscience: Values for Survival. (1970) 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
132 
Fraser,J.T. Of Time. Passion, and Knowledge. (1975) New York: George 
Braziller, Inc. 
Fraser. j.T. Time as Conflict. (1978). Basel and Stuttgart: Birkhauser Verlag. 
Gray, J. Glenn. The Warriors: Reflections of Men in Battle. (1970). New 
York: Harper Colophon Books. 
Heidegger, M. Basic Writings of Martin Heidegger. (Ed.). David Farrell Krell. 
(1977). New York: Harper and Row. 
Heidegger, M. History of the Concept of Time. (Trans.). Theodore Kisiel. 
(1985). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M. Identity and Difference. (Trans.). Joan Stambaugh. (1969). 
New York: Harper and Row. 
Heidegger, M. Poetry. Language. Thought. (Trans.). Albert Hofstadter. 
(1971). New York: Harper and Row. 
Heidegger, M. The Question of Being. (Trans.). William Kluback and Jean T. 
Wilde. (1958). New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc. 
Heidegger, M. What is Called Thinking? (Trans.). Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn 
Gray. (1968). New York: Harper and Row. 
Heschel, A. A Passion for Truth. (1973). New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Girouz. 
Heschel, A. Between God and Man: An Interpretation of ludaism. (Ed.). 
Fritz A. Rothschild. (1959). New York: The Free Press. 
Husserl, E. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. 
(Trans.). Dorion Cairns. (1960). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff. 
Jaynes, J. The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral 
Mind. (1976). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
133 
Kaplan ,J. (Ed.). Walt Whitman: Collected Poetry and Collected Prose. 
(1982). New York: The Library of America. 
Kirk, G.S., Raven ,J.E. The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a 
Selection of Texts. (1957). London: Cambridge University Press. 
Kostelanetz, R. (Ed.). John Cage. (1970). New York: Praeger Publishers. 
Maritain, J. Art  and Scholast icism and The Frontiers  of  Poetrv. (Trans.). 
Joseph W. Evans. (1962). New York: Charles Scribners Sons. 
Maritian.J. Creative Intuition in Art and Poetrv. (1953) New York: 
Pantheon Books, Inc. 
Mood, J.H.L. (Trans.) Rilke on Love and Other Difficulties. (1975). New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company. 
Mooney, R. L. The Phenomenon of Creativity. (1979). Columbus: The Ohio 
State University. 
Moustakas, C. Loneliness. (1961). Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Murray, M. (Ed.) Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. (1978). New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Natanson, M. (Ed.). Essavs in Phenomenology. (1969). The Hague, 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Natanson, M. (Ed.). Phenomenology and Social Reality. Essavs in Memory of 
Alfred Schutz. (1970). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Nietzsche, F. Thus Spake Zarathustra. (1983). New York: Random House. 
Nishitani, K. Religion and Nothingness. (Trans.) Jan Van Bragt. (1982). Los 
Angeles: University of California Press. 
Oakeshett, M. The Voice of Poetrv in the Conversation of Mankind. (1959). 
London: Bowes and Bowes. 
13*4  
Quasha, G., Rothenberg, J. (Ed.). America: A Prophecy. (1973). New York: 
Random House. 
Rothenberg, J. Pre-faces. (1981). New York: New Directions Books. 
Rothenberg, J. Rothenberg, D. (Ed.). Symposium of the Whole. (1983). 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Rajchman, J., West, C. (Ed.). Post-Analvtic Philosophy. (1985). New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Runes, D.D. (Trans.). German Eiistentialism. (1965). New York: Philosophical 
Library. 
Schwarz, E. (Ed.). Rainer Maria Rilke: Prose and Poetry. (1984). New York: 
Continuum Publishing Company. 
Shahan, R.W., Mohanty, J.N. (Ed.). Thinking About Being: Aspects of 
Heidegger's Thought. (1984). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Smith, N.K. (Trans.). Immanuel  Kant 's  Cri t ique of  Pure Reason. (1968). New 
York: St. Martin s Press. 
Sokolowski. R. Husserlian Meditations. (1974). Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press. 
Stapleton, T.J. Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of a Phenomenological 
Beginning. (1983). Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Water house, R. A Heidegger Critique. (1981). Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 
Humanities Press Inc. 
Wolff, R.P. Kant's Theory of Mental Activity. (1963). Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press. 
Zukav, G. The Dancing Wu Li Masters. (1979). New York: Bantam Books. 
